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 ABSTRACT 
Leveraging Policy for Renewable Energy Development in  
Industrialized Countries and Emerging Markets 
Amy Tang 
 
Renewable energy has the ability to play a dominate role in addressing both rising energy 
demand and the need for sustainable growth. Various policy measures and incentives have aided 
its growth in both developed and developing countries. This dissertation analyzes existing 
policies and financial mechanisms used to encourage renewable energy development through 
three academic papers. I first propose the carbon revenue bond as a new financing tool to 
complement the environmental credit markets that exist in developed countries. Stochastic 
modeling techniques are used to simulate future credit prices and determine bond value. Use of 
the carbon revenue bond is illustrated through three examples of wind energy projects in the 
European, Australian and New Jersey markets. In the absence of mature markets in developing 
countries, I develop the strategic structure matrix as a new framework to explain the various 
effects of policy measures in order to better shape future policy design. By synthesizing previous 
literature on how organizations are able to affect the diffusion of a new technology, the strategic 
structure matrix is able to deepen understanding of how policy can influence renewable energy 
growth. The explanatory power of the framework is demonstrated through a case study on the 
different paces of wind power diffusion in five Indian states. Lastly, I evaluate the Clean 
Development Mechanism as a tool to encourage investment from developed nations for 
renewable infrastructure in developing countries. I create an agent-based model to simulate 
investment decisions under different improvements to the program, providing quantitative 
 support for the effectiveness of some improvements over others. In addition to each paper’s 
individual contributions, the findings collectively provide important implications for the future of 
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“Our dependence on fossil fuels amounts to global pyromania, and the only fire 
extinguisher we have at our disposal is renewable energy.” 
 
– Hermann Scheer (2006)   
 
 
Global energy demand is rising. World population is expected to surpass 8.5 billion in 
2035 and many developing countries are experiencing rapid industrial growth. Over the next two 
decades, energy consumption is projected to rise by 50 percent (Energy Information 
Administration, 2010a) and developing countries will account for 80 percent of increased 
electricity demand worldwide (Gupta, 2012). Meeting these needs with fossil fuels is 
unsustainable; resources are limited and the greenhouse gas emissions associated with burning 
fossil fuels have been repeatedly linked to climate change. Lowering the current level of 
emissions, or at the very least avoiding additional emissions, is a priority for policymakers 
worldwide. Generating energy from renewable sources simultaneously addresses the dual 
concerns of rising energy demands and the need to reduce environmental pollution. In fact, 
development of renewable energy (RE) constitutes 21 percent of the effort proposed by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) to cut emissions in half by 20501 (IEA, 2008). 
Great strides have been made to develop and use renewables for electricity production, 
heating and cooling, and transportation. In 2010, renewable sources generated 16.7 percent of 
total energy consumed worldwide, and wind capacity alone has increased from 6.1 gigawatts in 
                                                          
1 Compared to 2005 emission levels. 
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1996 to 238 gigawatts in 2011 (REN21, 2012). However, as demand for energy continues to 
increase, particularly in developing countries where it has historically outpaced supply, there is 
an urgent need for greater inclusion of RE in the global energy portfolio. Unfortunately, 
diffusion of RE technologies has been met with several hurdles. Many countries have 
experienced a “carbon lock-in” of incumbent energy sources, with existing infrastructure unable 
to adapt past fossil fuel-based resources (Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006). RE 
infrastructure is also extremely capital-intensive with a long payback period since the amount of 
revenue collected during operations is small relative to the initial cost. Oftentimes, development 
of RE is hindered by lack of financing and difficulty attracting capital (Gupta, 2012; Liming, 
2009; Masini and Menichetti, 2012). The high risk perception of newer technologies leads to a 
higher cost of capital compared with conventional sources of energy (Donovan and Nunez, 2012; 
Sadorsky, 2012), and there is no inherent financial compensation for the positive externalities of 
not emitting greenhouse gases. This is especially true in developing countries where other social 
priorities act as competition for scarce funds (Gupta, 2012). 
 
POLICIES TO AID RENEWABLE ENERGY GROWTH 
Policies have been introduced on a local, national and global scale to reduce greenhouse 
gas emission output and encourage development of RE infrastructure. In this section, I provide 
an introduction to the primary policies analyzed in this dissertation. Some programs are aimed at 
improving current technologies or developing new ones. Several countries have dedicated funds 
for research laboratories and technology centers. The Center for Wind Energy Technology in 
India, for example, launched several demonstration projects in three states to test the potential of 
wind and the machines used to harness its power in the late 1980s. 
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A large portion of policies have provided financial incentives to developers of RE or 
emissions reducing projects. Tax incentives have been popular on national and regional scales, 
including the Production Tax Credit in the United States, which provide tax relief to producers of 
renewable energy, and accelerated depreciation in India, which initially allowed developers to 
depreciate the full value of RE assets. These have led to the financing of many RE projects by 
tax investors, larger corporations able to take full advantage of the added tax benefits. Several 
countries also offer developers no- or low-interest loans at national or local levels to help build 
confidence in RE technologies and the banking infrastructure surrounding them. More assistance 
has been offered in the form of subsidies and grants. For example, Brazil uses an electricity 
surcharge on power consumers to support a fund for RE development (Dutra and Szklo, 2008). 
Lastly, feed-in tariffs and generation-based incentives offer a higher price to electricity produced 
from RE projects than conventional sources. Under a feed-in tariff, utilities pay a higher prices to 
buy electricity generated from RE in order to compensate for the higher technological costs and 
reward its positive environmental externality. Essentially, this is a cross-subsidy in which RE is 
supported in part by conventional generation methods. Unfortunately, tax credits are subject to 
approval and renewal and are dependent on budget availability, making them unreliable tools for 
sustained development of RE (Bolinger, 2008; Carley, 2011; Harper et al., 2007; Kahn, 1996). 
Additionally, tax investors have interests that are not always aligned with the developers. 
Evidence from India showed that while investors were motivated to build more RE 
infrastructure, they were not incentivized to ensure continued electricity output (Pillai and 
Banerjee, 2009; Rajsekhar et al., 1999). 
Numerous regulatory policies exist to help developers realize RE projects. At the most 
basic level, just having a renewable energy policy signals to investors a government’s support 
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and confidence in the technologies. Similarly, pledges to reduce emission level show a long term 
commitment to sustainable development and environmental awareness. These policies ensure 
that a minimum standard is met, for example, at least a certain amount of electricity is produced 
from renewable sources. Below, I discuss two regulatory measures most relevant to this 
dissertation in detail, particularly for Chapters 2 and 4, the Kyoto Protocol and its accompanying 
Clean Development Mechanism, and renewable portfolio standards. These regulatory measures 
often lead to market-based compliance methods, which have been found to be more effective and 
efficient than tax incentives (Langniss and Wiser, 2003; Palmer et al., 2011). 
  
Kyoto Protocol and Clean Development Mechanism 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty between member states of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 
2005. A binding pledge was adopted by several industrialized (“Annex I”) nations to reduce or 
limit greenhouse gas emissions compared to a base-year level, 1990 for most countries, in two 
commitment periods, 2008 to 2012 and 2013 to 2020. Currently, 37 Annex I countries have 
binding reduction targets ranging from 0.5 percent to 24 percent by 2020. Notably, the US did 
not ratify the treaty, and Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia either withdrew from the treaty 
or did not renew their targets for the second commitment period.  
The Kyoto Protocol is a cap and trade policy. While emission levels are capped for each 
country, compliance can be achieved in several ways, in part by using zero- or low-emitting 
technologies for energy that was previously produced with higher emitting methods, like burning 
fossil fuels. Since greenhouse gases differ in their impact on the environment, reductions are 
measured in equivalent tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2). Emission reduction is awarded with one 
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certificate per tonne of CO2, which must be turned in for compliance. For example, if a country 
was emitting 100 units of CO2 and had a 20 percent reduction target, it must turn in 20 
certificates at the end of the compliance period. Countries that reduce beyond their targets are 
able to sell their credits through intergovernmental emissions trading to countries unable to meet 
their targets. The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), for example, facilitates 
buyers and sellers of carbon credits, intended to reduce emissions in the most cost effective 
manner.  
In addition to its own actions at emission reduction and purchasing credits, an Annex I 
country can meet its target through flexibility mechanisms built into the Kyoto Protocol, most 
notably the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM allows Annex I countries to 
invest in a sustainability project in a developing country (host country) that has no binding 
emission reduction goals. The project “generates” avoided emissions compared to a baseline 
scenario. In other words, total emissions with the project are less than if the host country were to 
proceed with business as usual. The majority of CDM projects are new renewable power plants 
and fuel replacement projects. Projects must apply for approval; registered projects are awarded 
emission avoidance certificates, also known as Certified Emission Reduction (CER) certificates, 
for each tonne of avoided CO2 or its equivalent. CERs can be used by Annex I countries to meet 
part of their binding commitments. Developing countries benefit since they receive investment in 
domestic infrastructure, and their ability to achieve economic growth is largely tied to energy 
supply. In theory, the CDM should encourage bi-lateral development of renewable energy 
projects in developing countries, in which an industrialized country’s investment in a project is 
repaid in part by CERs. Recently, unilateral projects developed solely by the non-Annex I host 
country have also emerged. The CERs are sold via various exchanges to a country looking to 
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meet its own binding target, similar to the way Annex I countries trade credits between one 
another. Even so, the CDM has been one of the primary ways in which developed countries 
subsidize renewable energy infrastructure in developing countries (Donovan and Nunez, 2012; 
Hultman et al., 2012; Lewis, 2010). 
 
Renewable portfolio standard 
Renewable portfolio standards (RPS), also called renewable purchase obligations (RPO), 
require a certain amount of electricity to be produced from renewable sources and are used to 
raise demand for a specific or set of RE technologies. Each unit of electricity produced from 
renewable sources is associated with a renewable energy certificate (REC), and utilities that 
purchase electricity to distribute to consumers must be able to produce the required amount of 
RECs. Some standards apply at the country level, including those for China and Australia, while 
some others target smaller areas, such as state level programs in the US and India. Additionally, 
there may be callouts for specific technologies. For example, New Jersey requires at least 5316 
GWh of electricity to be produced by solar technologies within the state. 
The rules and regulations of each RPS vary widely even within the same country. The 
differences between US programs, for example, including compliance percentages, existence of 
technology carve-outs, and even the definition of “renewable” (Carley, 2009; Davies, 2010; 
Langniss and Wiser, 2003). In some programs, the electricity and the RECs are treated 
separately. In these cases, utilities purchase power to serve their customers and RECs to comply 
with regulations, sometimes from different sources. Markets similar to the ones for carbon 
credits facilitate transactions between RE producers and utilities. Noncompliance leads to fines, 
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or alternative compliance payments (ACP), although inadequate enforcement has been observed 
in some programs. 
 
DISSERTATION THEME AND FORMAT 
While great strides have been made to shift towards a sustainable energy economy, 
continued support is necessary as renewable energy depends on a high level of regulatory drivers 
as compared to other industries (Burer and Wustenhagan, 2009). I extend previous research on 
how energy policy and incentives impact RE development, their weaknesses and unintended 
consequences, the certain financing methods they favor and the ways in which they can improve. 
There is tension in the existing literature as to which policy actions work best. Evidence from 
some empirical studies suggest that tax incentives were the primary policy motivator for 
increased investment in wind power projects (Bird et al., 2005; Pillai and Banerjee, 2009; 
Rajsekhar et al., 1999). Other researchers have found, however, that regulatory measures were 
more effective (Davies, 2010; Nogee et al., 2007; Palmer et al., 2011). While continued analysis 
and improvement of energy policy will aid renewable energy growth, the conflicting studies 
indicate that perhaps there is no “one size fits all” policy solution. In fact, results from a survey 
study by Luthi and Prassler (2011) showed investor preference for policy measures varies not 
only with the existing policy environment, but is also dependent on the national investment 
culture and other organizational and behavioral factors. A narrower focus is necessary to address 
the needs of different countries. 
This dissertation is motivated by the conclusion that “energy policy cannot be formulated 
in isolation from…social and other objectives,” and countries require different approaches for 
RE growth based on their unique landscape of existing policies and goals for sustainability 
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(Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye, 2007, p. 2488). The research presented here follows the three 
paper format. The overarching research question of “how can policy be leveraged to increase 
renewable energy development?” and the subtopics explored are presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 Figure 1. Overall research question and subtopics explored. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the first paper, which introduces a new financing instrument for RE 
projects to enhance regulatory policy such as emission limits and minimum RE production 
requirements in countries with markets to support credit trading. I begin by analyzing federal and 
state level incentives used in the US to promote wind power development and the most prevalent 
financing structures that have emerged as a result. Focusing narrowly on their weaknesses, I 
propose the “carbon revenue bond” as a financial instrument which can be used to complement 
REC and carbon markets where one exists. The bond securitizes future revenue to help address 
the high capital costs of RE. I present a way to price the bond using stochastic methods and 
demonstrate the impact of the bond in three international markets: the European Union carbon 
market, the Australian REC market, and the New Jersey Solar REC (SREC) market. 
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Chapter 3 begins to address countries that are newer entrants into the renewable energy 
industry, namely developing countries, and are still seeking to create efficient policy measures.  I 
do so by examining why some policy measures are more effective than others at encouraging 
wind power diffusion in India. The segmented nature of the Indian energy sector with a high 
level of state autonomy provides for interesting comparisons across different states. I use a 
diffusion of innovation lens to analyze strategies used by organizations to promote diffusion. 
Building on past literature, I develop the strategic structure matrix as a novel framework to 
improve analysis on how organizations impact diffusion. The explanatory value of the matrix is 
established by examining the different incentives offered in five states—Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh—and the resulting patterns of diffusion. 
Building on the findings of Chapter 3 which qualitatively explain why some policies are 
more effective than others, Chapter 4 provides a method to determine the quantitative impact of a 
policy on total RE investment. I develop and build an agent-based model to simulate total 
investment RE infrastructure under different policy scenarios. I use the model to determine the 
impact of suggested improvements to the CDM on investment in wind power projects in India, 
Brazil and China. The pricing technique in Chapter 2 is used here to calculate the return on 
investment and the strategic structure matrix from Chapter 3 is used to complement analysis of 
the different reactions of India, Brazil and China to the CDM and its improvements. The results 
provide insight into how future policy can be shaped to achieve maximum impact. 
Chapter 5 discusses the overall contributions of this dissertation to designing policy and 
financial instruments to aid RE development. Chapter 6 suggests future areas of research that 
would extend and expand on the findings of this dissertation. Lastly, an alphabetical list of 





FINANCING RENEWABLE ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE: FORMULATION, PRICING AND 




Renewable energy systems depend on large financial incentives to compete with 
conventional generation methods. Market-based incentives, including state-level REC markets 
and international carbon markets have been proposed as solutions to increase renewable energy 
investment. In this paper we introduce and formulate a carbon revenue bond, a financing tool to 
complement environmental credit markets to encourage renewable energy investment. To 
illustrate its use, we value the bond by predicting future revenue using stochastic processes after 
analyzing historical price data. Three illustrative examples are presented for renewable energy 
development in three different markets: Europe, Australia and New Jersey. Our findings reveal 
that the sale of a carbon revenue bond with a ten year maturity can finance a significant portion 
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Over the next 20 years energy consumption is projected to rise by 50% (Energy 
Information Administration, 2010a). Meeting these increased demands with energy produced 
from fossil fuels is unsustainable and detrimental to the environment. Generating energy from 
renewable sources simultaneously address the dual concerns of rising energy demands and the 
need to reduce environmental pollution. Yet renewable energy projects are extremely capital-
intensive. The amount of revenue collected during operations is small relative to the initial cost, 
leading to a long payback period. Owners and developers of renewable energy infrastructure turn 
to outside investors to finance portions of the high initial capital costs. 
In this paper, we discuss incentives currently being used to promote renewable energy 
development, many of which, such as the federal Production Tax Credit (PTC) and state-level 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) programs, do not help defray the high initial cost. We then 
propose a “carbon revenue bond” as a financial instrument which can be used to complement 
Renewable Energy Credit (REC) and carbon markets where one exists. The bond essentially 
securitizes future revenue from REC or carbon credit sales to raise initial capital from investors, 
who are later repaid with those future revenues. We describe a way to price the bond using 
stochastic processes to predict future credit prices after analysis of historical data. Its use is 
demonstrated in three illustrative examples during which a hypothetical renewable energy 
system is developed in three different markets: the European Union carbon market, the 
Australian REC market, and the New Jersey Solar REC (SREC) market. The results show that a 
carbon revenue bond can finance a meaningful portion of initial development costs. Quantitative 
risk analysis is also provided for each example. We conclude with a discussion on the potential 




RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE US 
Deregulation of electricity markets started in the 1990s at a state level. It had the effect of 
separating the activity of generation from transmission and distribution, and created a 
competitive market for electricity generation, or wholesale production. Deregulation allowed the 
private sector to own, operate and otherwise invest in electricity generation infrastructure, 
including ones using renewable sources, without having to participate in transmission or 
distribution activities. However, renewable energy systems can have difficulty competing with 
less expensive generation techniques, such as a conventional coal-fired plant. The U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2010b) recently published average levelized costs of new 
generation sources for plants entering service in 2016. Levelized cost is commonly used as a way 
to compare costs of different electricity generation types. The calculations take into account the 
initial capital costs, fuel costs, operations and maintenance costs and any necessary transmission 
investment. The total project cost is then converted into equal annual payments based on the 
amount of electricity produced, the project life span and financing costs, with the impact of 
inflation removed. Figure 2 summarizes the EIA’s findings (EIA, 2010b). 
 
 
Figure 2. Levelized cost of electricity generation methods. 
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The black bars indicate the range of estimates and the white circles represent the average 
costs for each generation type. Offshore wind and both types of solar energy can be over two to 
three times the cost of coal or natural gas. Even though wind projects developed on land are 
close to coal costs per MWh of electricity produced, when the amount of electricity produced per 
year is taken into account, the costs rapidly increase. A 300 MW wind farm, based on a capacity 
factor of 34% used in EIA’s calculations, could produce 893,520 MWh of electricity per year, 
making the equivalent additional cost almost 1.8 million U.S. dollars per year throughout the 30 
year analysis period. 
Thus, federal, state and local governments have responded with various policies and 
financial incentives aimed to “facilitate the diversification of electricity generation mixes, 
increase renewable energy deployment, reduce state reliance on fossil fuels, help renewable 
energy sources become cost competitive with conventional energy sources, reduce carbon 
emissions, or various combinations thereof” (Carley, 2009, p. 3072). In the next section we 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these incentives toward financing renewable energy 
investment. 
 
Federal level policies and incentives 
Issued federally, the Production Tax Credit (PTC) offers privately- or investor- owned 
renewable energy plants an inflation- adjusted tax credit of 1.5 cents per kWh of electricity 
generated for the first ten years of its operation. As of early 2012, the credit is priced at 2.2 cents 
per kWh. Analogously, the Renewable Energy Production Incentive (REPI) provides the same 
credit to renewable plants owned by utilities, governments or rural co-ops (Menz and Vachon, 
2006). Both were instituted as a part of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. The Investment Tax 
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Credit (ITC) and Treasury grant gives a one-time tax break or grant, respectively, based on the 
initial amount of project investment during the first year of service (North Carolina Solar Center, 
2010). A Treasury grant may cover up to 30% of initial capital costs for certain renewable 
sources (North Carolina Solar Center, 2010). As a part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, renewable energy developers can apply to receive a cash payment 
totaling 30% of eligible project costs in lieu of tax payments, although funds are limited. 
Additionally, low and no interest loans and bonds are available to help finance qualified projects 
(North Carolina Solar Center, 2010). 
Although current federal incentives promote renewable energy investment, they depend 
heavily on the political climate and continued legislative support. The PTC, for instance, has 
been found to be the most effective of the federal incentives (Bird et al., 2005). However, it has 
expired and been extended numerous times, often with extended lapses, and did not exist for 
most of 2004. When the credit is extended, it is generally only for one or two years at a time. 
Additionally, PTCs can only be used by projects that entered service during a year that credit 
was in place. For example, a wind farm that entered service in 2004 would not be eligible to 
receive the credit when it was renewed in 2005. Its sister credit, the REPI, is dependent on 
allotments from the Congressional budget and carries with it large amounts of uncertainty (Bird 
et al., 2005). The constant threat of disappearing credits makes it extremely difficult to plan 
financially for the project’s lifespan. The initial planning and permitting process may take over 
two years, by which time the credit may have already expired and construction on the facility not 
even have begun. Developers that depend on the PTC as a subsidy to make a project financially 
attractive hesitate to construct new facilities or may abandon renewable energy projects all 
together. The bust-boom cycle of wind power development in the early 2000s were caused in 
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part by the uncertainty surrounding these credits (Bolinger et al., 2009; Harper et al., 2007). In 
general, tax incentives have played a secondary role to other policy instruments as promoters of 
renewable energy development (Carley, 2011).  
Another feature of the PTCs ill-suited for renewable energy projects is the timing of the 
payment. Specifically, renewable projects require greater up-front costs than conventional power 
plants while having no fuel costs, but the tax incentive is given at the power production stage 
instead of during initial development (Harper et al., 2007). In the aptly titled article “The 
production tax credit for wind turbine power plants is an in effective incentive,” Kahn (1996) 
drives the point home, saying “the tax credit…does nothing to bring the capital structure of wind 
projects more into line with the competing conventional alternatives” (Kahn, 1996, p. 432). In 
effect, there is no assistance to facilitate the high initial capital investment while the increased 
revenue stream at the production level occurs when fuel costs are zero. This mismatch has 
complicated financing for wind projects especially for developers with insufficient need of the 
full tax benefits (Harper et al., 2007). Innovative financing structures discussed later in the paper 
have evolved to circumvent the mismatch but have become problematic in their own way after 
the recession (Harper et. al., 2007). 
 
State level policies and incentives 
States have played an increasingly large role in setting their own policies and objectives 
for renewable energy development (Rabe, 2011). Many of them mirror federal incentives and 
include tax exemptions/deductions/credits, grants, loans and production incentives, some of 
which may cover up to 30% of development costs (Menz and Vachon, 2006; North Carolina 
Solar Center, 2010). Around 40 states have some sort of Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 
legislation (North Carolina Solar Center, 2010; Davies, 2010), under which utilities are required 
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to purchase a certain percentage of total electricity delivered to the end user from renewable 
sources. Several studies have evaluated the effectiveness of different state policies on renewable 
energy development (Langniss and Wiser, 2003; Bird et al., 2005; Menz and Vachon, 2006; 
Carley, 2009). For a more in-depth review of state energy policy instruments, please see Carley 
(2011). Combined, these studies suggest that an RPS can effectively promote renewable energy 
development if designed and implemented well. A positive correlation is found between 
renewable energy production of a state and the presence of RPS policies in its neighbors, as well 
as the number of years a state’s RPS has been under implementation. 
However, these programs vary drastically from state to state. For a more detailed analysis 
of policy differences, please refer to Wiser et al. (2007). The lack of uniformity between state 
programs, including differences in compliance percentages, existence of technology carve-outs, 
and even the definition of “renewable,” creates an uneven playing field and a “market distortion” 
of its true value (Davies, 2010). This implies inefficient development of renewable energy with 
respect to technology choice and geographical location on a national level. Taken individually, 
the RPS of some states has been much more successful at increasing renewable energy 
developments than others. Discrepancies in their effectiveness have been attributed to program 
designs, where some states may have overly aggressive RPS benchmarks, too many exemptions, 
or inadequate policy enforcement (Carley, 2009; Langniss and Wiser, 2003). 
Furthermore, since revenue from credit sales are not received until after the start of 
electricity production, these incentives do not help overcome the initial high capital costs 
associated with renewable energy infrastructure. This is the same problem with the Federal 




Regional policies and incentives 
Although proponents of a national RPS believe that it is more economically effective and 
efficient than an aggregate of fragmented systems (Davies, 2010; Nogee et al., 2007) and studies 
have evaluated potential efficacy of different national systems (Palmer, 2011), energy policy will 
likely remain state-centric in the upcoming years (Rabe, 2011). But in the absence of national 
legislation, leaders of states and regions have formed regional initiatives and voluntary emissions 
markets. The most developed is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), composed of 
ten states in the Northeast, which started carbon auctions in 2008 (Rabe, 2011). The Western 
Climate Initiative (WCI) and Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA), with 
participation from both US states and Canadian territories, are still deciding on their emission 
allowance processes (Rabe, 2011). Similarly, there are several international cap-and-trade 
programs that formed as a result of the Kyoto Protocol, under which many nations pledged to 
reduce their carbon output. The most mature market is the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS). Again, like the PTC and REC trading in RPS programs, revenue from carbon 
credit sales are not received until after electricity production and therefore the developer is 
required to secure initial capital in other ways. In this paper, we refer to both RECs and carbon 
credits collectively as “environmental credits” which are issued by a central authority and can be 
traded. 
 
Financing structure for renewable energy in the US 
The emergence of PTCs and state-level incentives has led the renewable power industry, 
more specifically the wind energy industry, to come up with innovative ways to finance its 
projects that take full advantage of those incentives. A survey done by Bolinger et al. (2009) 
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identifies six principal financing structures through which most utility-scale wind projects from 
1999–2008 have been developed in the United States. The study excludes utility-owned projects 
which are subject to different tax regulations. 
The traditional way to finance a wind project is with a corporate structure. The parent 
company invests 100% equity into the project and in return receives all of the cash revenue and 
all of the tax benefits. However, only large developers have been able to take full advantage of 
the tax benefits, including the PTCs discussed earlier. This has led to the emergence of two types 
of tax investors: the strategic investor and the institutional investor. Both the strategic and 
institutional investors are larger entities who contribute equity to the project and are able to fully 
use the tax benefits, but the strategic investor is seeking an active role in the project and 
contributes more equity while the institutional investor is a more passive party and contributes 
less equity. The revenue from electricity sales and REC sales go to the project developer while 
the PTC and any additional tax savings are received by the investor. 
In the back leveraged structure, similar to that of the institutional investor, the developer 
takes on third party debt to cover his/her share of the equity contribution, while the tax investor 
contribution remains the same. In the cash leveraged structure, the project company takes on a 
third party debt to help finance the project, in turn reducing the equity contributions of both the 
developer and the tax investor. The last structure described by Bolinger is the cash and PTC 
leveraged structure in which PTCs can also be used to repay project-level debt. This structure has 
only been used twice in the time period explored. 
With the exception of the corporate structure, the other structures depend heavily on 
outside tax investors for financing. Entities able to take advantage of such considerable tax 
benefits are large investment and commercial banks and insurance companies and interest in 
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renewable energy projects have decreased since the 2008 economic downturn (Schwabe et al., 
2009). Also notable about all six structures is that, while developers and investors alike have 
separated out the PTC savings as a distinct avoided expense and have even used it to leverage 
debt, they continue to lump electricity sales and REC sales into a single cash stream. Perhaps this 
is because RECs do not currently exist in all states, or maybe because some REC markets are 
relatively new in some states. Whatever the reason, combining electricity and RECs into a single 
revenue pool from which to pay back debtors or earn returns does not efficiently highlight the 
differences in their characteristics or adequately mitigate the risk profiles of each asset. Creating 
two revenue streams allows investors to participate in each market separately and make more 
managed decisions about their investments and their associated risks. In fact, the very existence 
of unbundled REC markets suggests a natural separation of electricity and RECs. With more 
states considering RPS and existing REC markets growing more mature, it is sensible that 
renewable energy project developers treat these incentives as a distinct and sizable cash flow 
stream. 
In this paper, we develop a novel financing tool that securitizes the future revenue of 
these credits in the form of a carbon revenue bond. The carbon revenue bond addresses the 
problem of current financing structures under which developers do not receive revenue from the 
sale of environmental credits until after electricity production starts, a situation that does nothing 
to help overcome the high start-up costs. With a carbon revenue bond, a renewable energy 
developer sells a bond to an interested investor who is repaid with revenue from the future sale 
of environmental credits. The bond raises money at the project development stage, thus 
providing the developer with funds up-font to defray the significant capital costs of renewable 
infrastructure. Moreover, it does not require investors to have heavy tax obligations, a problem 
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with PTCs, therefore expanding the pool of available candidates. The following section will 
provide a brief background on revenue bonds, describe the structure of a carbon revenue bond 
and demonstrate its use. 
 
CARBON REVENUE BOND 
Background on revenue bonds 
Local governments have been issuing municipality bonds for decades. They are generally 
used to finance public infrastructure needs such as roads, schools, power and water facilities, 
hospitals, public housing, etc. The bonds can be either general obligation, in which the 
repayment is secured by the issuer’s ability to tax, or a revenue bond, where the investor is 
repaid by proceeds from a pool of projects and its ability to generate revenue. In the case of a 
project revenue bond, the bond purchaser chooses to invest in a specific project, for example a 
bridge, and interest and principle repayments are secured only with future revenue generated by 
user fees such as tolls. If the project does not perform as expected and revenues are lower than 
projected, the investor has no recourse over the issuer’s other assets or profitable projects. A 
notable example of this is the original Tacoma Narrows Bridge, financed partly using project 
revenue bonds, which collapsed shortly after its opening in 1940. Had it not been for insurance, 
the bond holders would have lost all of their investment (Fordham, 1942). 
Investors are drawn to revenue bonds because of their relatively low-risk profile and tax-
exempt status on interest earnings. As a result, the rate of return is usually lower than other 
market investments. In order to increase the credibility of a revenue- backed bond, rigorous 
revenue forecasts, sensitivity tests and some form of risk analysis is usually required. Oftentimes 
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additional institutional entities are involved, including a bond issuing agency and a credit rating 
agency (AASHTO, 2011). 
The emergence of public–private-partnerships in infrastructure has led to the creation of 
private activity bonds. A special type of revenue bond, the private activity bond is issued by a 
private enterprise tasked with developing public infrastructure. Certain projects categories—
detailed in the Internal Revenue Code—qualify for tax exempt status.3 One of them is the new I-
495 Capital Beltway HOT Lanes currently under construction in Fairfax Country, Virginia. Out 
of a total cost of US$2 billion, US$586 million (29.3%) is being financed using private activity 
bonds backed by toll revenue, also referred to as toll revenue bonds (AASHTO, 2011). 
Sometimes smaller projects can be financed entirely by these bonds. For the addition of express 
toll lanes to the heavily congested SR91 highway in Orange County, California, the project 
company was able to finance the $135 million project using long-term tax-exempt toll revenue 
bonds (Poole and Orski, 2003). The new lanes are generating sufficient revenue to cover the debt 
service on the bonds, as well as all operations and maintenance costs (Poole and Orski, 2003). 
This subset of bonds is applicable to private sector players who are seeking financing to 
develop renewable energy assets. There can be two revenue streams for renewable energy 
projects. The first is the sale of electricity, which is common across all generation assets 
regardless of source. The second comes from the sale of environmental credits if the project is 
developed in a location in which a market for them exists. In short, the positive externality of the 
low- or no-carbon nature of renewable energy systems becomes monetized in these credits, and 
proceeds from the sale of credits are an additional revenue stream to which developers of non-
renewable energy do not have access. By securitizing this particular revenue stream in the same 
                                                          
3 The authors are not well versed in US tax law. Practitioners should always consult tax code before making any 
assumptions about the tax-exempt status of any private activity bond. 
22 
 
fashion as that of toll revenues, renewable energy developers can sell bonds to finance a project. 
It should be noted here that these bonds securitize only revenue from the environmental credits 
and not electricity sales. Creating two revenue streams allows investors to participate in each 
market separately and make more managed decisions about their investments and their 
associated risks. Carbon revenue bonds are able to improve upon the good intentions of carbon 
credits and RECs by not only awarding renewable energy producers a production subsidy, but 
doing so at the start of the project to overcome high start-up costs. Additionally, like all other 
project revenue bonds, the carbon revenue bond also protects a developer’s established and 
future projects from exposure to the risks of the current one. It also protects a developer’s 
earnings from electricity sales since the two revenue streams are no longer lumped into one. 
 
Structure of carbon revenue bond 
Initially, the owner sells and issues the bond to an investor who pays an initial amount x. 
How and when the investor is repaid is commonly referred to as the structure of the bond. As the 
seller of a revenue bond, there are two components to consider: the asset cash flow, which 
represents revenue received, and the liabilities cash flow, which represents payments to the buyer 
of the bond. For simplicity, we will set up the carbon revenue bond as a pass-through bond, so 
that the asset cash flow mirrors the liabilities cash flow. In other words, whenever the seller of 
the bond receives revenue from the sale of environmental credits, he or she “passes-through” that 
revenue directly to the buyer. The examples in this paper use a bond maturity of 10 years. Other 
types of bond structures, including different bond maturities, bullet bonds and those similar to an 
annuity are discussed later in the paper. 
23 
 
After paying the initial amount x, a carbon revenue bond entitles the investor to collect 
repayment backed by the revenue from the sale of environmental credits every year for t years. 
The time, t, until full repayment is commonly referred to as the bond maturity. We use ci to 
denote revenue received from environmental credit sales in year i, which will differ year to year 




Figure 3. Cash flow diagram for buyer of a carbon revenue bond. 
 
To make the bond a fair investment, the initial investment should equal the sum of the 
repayment amounts given an appropriate interest rate, r, with each ci properly discounted. Future 
revenue received from the sale of the credits can be predicted, and the initial price of the bond, x, 












The equation states that the initial investment is equal to the sum of the discounted value of all 
future repayment amounts, given a rate of return, r. It is critical that environmental credit prices 
are carefully forecasted for the length of the bond. Grossly inaccurate predictions can lead to 
unfairly high or low returns for the investor. Therefore, it is important to choose a pricing 
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technique that can appropriately represent future behavior of credit prices. In the following 
section, we present a way to model future credit prices using stochastic processes, which are 
commonly used to model other assets. Other models and the inherent risks associated with the 
uncertainty of future prices are discussed later in the paper. 
 
Modeling of future environmental credit prices 
The choice of which model to use to predict future prices is not an easy one. For this 
paper we chose to use stochastic models, in which the change in price follows a random process 
subject to a probability distribution. We believe they contain many advantages relative to 
deterministic models and those that require estimation of other variables. First, environmental 
credits can be treated as tradable assets or commodities like stocks and steel, and the movement 
of prices of tradable assets is frequently modeled using stochastic processes (Schwartz, 1997). A 
large number of processes, including some of the ones used in this paper, have been developed or 
augmented specifically for use in modeling financial assets. Second, simulating prices using a 
stochastic process allows developers to quantifiably evaluate the risk of the bond because it 
provides a range and distribution of projected prices, something deterministic models cannot do. 
That is, simulation results produce a mean number for the value of the bond, but also a 
distribution around that mean, so that the probability of loss can be calculated (for example, 
“there is a 12% chance that losses will be incurred by selling the bond”). Lastly, the data used to 
calibrate the stochastic models are real, historical prices. Input-output models use predicted 
values such as global temperature increase, or assign a numerical value to a non-numerical 
property, for instance, willingness to use clean energy. These models build predictions on top of 
predictions and can be limiting in their application. To illustrate the use of stochastic processes 
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as a modeling tool, we follow Brigo and colleagues’ approach (2009) of simulating future asset 
prices from several stochastic process and then comparing the results to historical asset prices to 
determine the best fitting process. Due to space constraints and the fact that this is only for 
illustrative purposes, only three processes are tested. The following subsections discuss the 
stochastic models we use: geometric Brownian motion, the NGARCH model, and the Jumps 
Diffusion model. A summary of the three processes can be found in Table 1. We then provide 
three illustrative examples on how to price a carbon revenue bond based on historical data from 
three different credits around the world: European Union Allowances for carbon emissions, 
Australian RECs and New Jersey SRECs. 
 
Table 1. Description of stochastic processes used. 




Fundamental random process. The increase or 
decrease in prices for each incremental time step 
comes from a normal distribution with a mean and 
standard deviation that remains constant 
throughout the simulation.  
Changes in daily prices will follow 
a normal distribution centered 
around a constant mean and 
standard deviation. 
NGARCH 
Process that allows volatility to change with time. 
Instead of staying constant throughout the entire 
simulation, the volatility changes based on the 
long run average, the standard deviation from the 
previous time step, and the direction of price 
movement with a decrease in price leading to 
higher volatility in the next time step. 
The change in volatility over time 
generally creates larger magnitude 
of price fluctuations for each time 
step. Fatter tails will be observed 
when looking at the histogram of 
daily returns over time. 
Jumps 
Diffusion 
Process that allows price jumps on top of 
movement created by GBM. The arrival of price 
jumps is categorized by a Poisson process which is 
independent of the GBM random process. 
Price spikes can be observed from 
time to time on top of the daily 
changes based on GBM. This 
again creates fatter tails in the 
histogram of returns over time. 
 
Geometric Brownian motion 
Geometric Brownian motion (GBM) is a fundamental random stochastic process for 
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where  tS = asset price, 
tdS = incremental change in asset price, 
 = percentage drift, 
 = percentage volatility (standard deviation of the drift),  
and  tdW = Wiener process, also known as standard Brownian motion, a process 
characterized by normally distributed independent identical distributed (IID) 
increments with a mean of 0 and variance equal to the time step, dt . 
 
GBM is a Markov Process, which means it is “memoryless” in the sense that only the 
current price is necessary to predict future prices, and past data does not factor into the model. In 
discrete form, it reduces to 
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where nZZZ ,, 21  are independent random numbers generated from the standard normal 
distribution (mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1). As evident from the equation, all that is 
necessary to predict the price in the next time step is the current price, the drift, μ, and the 
volatility, σ, which can be calibrated from historical data using maximum likelihood estimation. 
Essentially, what is simulated at each time step is the amount of asset returns. Together with 
information on the price from the previous time step, the price for the next time step is 
calculated. 
There are several limitations to geometric Brown motion. First, it assumes the 
randomness (the Wiener process) in generating asset returns is characterized by a standard 
normal distribution. Additionally, it does not capture mean reverting properties and also assumes 
constant volatility. Many asset prices exhibit behaviors that do not fit neatly into a standard 
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normal distribution and many models have subsequently been developed to capture these 
intricacies. Next we explore processes that take into account some of the weaknesses of GBM. 
 
NGARCH model 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models allow 
volatility to change with time and past information (Bollerslev, 1986). The GARCH(1,1)4 model 
is represented by the following equation, where the volatility term, σ, is a function of t: 
         iiiii tdWtStdttStdS    




  iii ttt   
and       22 iii tdWtt   . 
 
The variance is a linear combination of three weighted parts: the average long run variance rate, 
the volatility from one time step before, and an additional random component. Therefore σ2 is 
assumed to be a stochastic process by itself. The weights must add up to 1, subject to the 
constraint 

   1. The non-linear GARCH (NGARCH) model (Engle and Ng, 1993) is an 
extension of the GARCH model that follows the assumption that ‘‘good news’’ or positive 
returns decrease volatility and stabilize prices while ‘‘bad news’’ or negative returns do the 
opposite. The equation for the NGARCH model is 
       iiii tdWtSdttStdS    




  iiii tttt   
and         22 iii tdWtt   . 
 
The NGARCH model has an extra parameter, gamma, which is always positive, that 
reduces the impact of “good news” and increases the impact of “bad news.” These conditional 
                                                          
4 In a GARCH(p,q) model, p and q represent the lag time and number of terms used, respectively, in producing the 
next data point. The GARCH(1,1) model uses 1 data point 1 day ago. 
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changes in volatility produce fatter tails in the distribution of simulated results instead of 
normally distributed as in the case with GBM. 
 
Jumps Diffusion model 
The Jumps Diffusion model (GBM with Jumps) is another way to capture the fat-tailed 
distribution of asset returns by introducing compound Poisson jumps to model the idiosyncratic 
shocks experienced by asset prices. This model was first used to price stock options (Merton, 
1976). The stochastic differential equation is 
tttttt dJSdWSdtSdS    
 
which is the GBM equation plus the univariate jump process,       tdNYtdJ tN 1 . 
The arrival of the jumps are determined by the Poisson process N, a discrete probability 
distribution that gives the probability, , that an event will happen in a given time period. Thus 
the expected number of jumps occurring in time t will be t. The size of each jump is determined 
by yet another random variable, Y, a log-normal distribution with mean Y and standard deviation 
Y. The Brownian motion W, the Poisson process N, and the size of the jumps Y are all 
independent from one another. The most straightforward way to simulate prices is by modeling 
the log-returns at time t, defined as 
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In this section we provide three illustrative examples to illustrate the potential impact of 
the carbon revenue bond on financing hypothetical yet realistic projects in three different 
markets: Europe, Australia and New Jersey. The frequency of and avenue through which 
environmental credits are traded vary from location to location. In Europe, the credits are traded 
at high volumes daily on an exchange and data is easily obtainable. In Australia, credits are 
mainly traded through brokers in over-the-counter transactions and data is not available for all 
days. In New Jersey, monthly averages of credit prices are used due to low trade volume and the 
state also has an alternative compliance payment, which has the same effect as a price cap. The 
three examples chosen illustrate a range of trading systems and a way to price the carbon revenue 
bond in each case, demonstrating wide applicability of the bond. 
 
European Union Allowances 
European Union Allowances (EUAs) are carbon credits used by European Union member 
states as a part of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) to lower emission 
levels. We start with EUAs because the EU ETS is the largest and longest established trading 
scheme with high volumes of credits being traded. Our data consists of historical spot prices, 
also known as next day futures, of EUAs traded on the European Climate Exchange from 
September 1, 2009 through August 31, 2010, consisting of 255 data points. It should be noted 
that information from any over-the-counter trades occurring during this time period is not 





Figure 4. Time series and histograms of EUA prices and log returns. 
 
Log returns are often used instead of asset prices to normalize data, where an increase in 
price during a time step correlates to positive returns, and vice versa. Using log returns allows 
comparison of different assets as well as of the same asset over different periods of time. Log 
returns also exhibit bell-shaped features in their distributions, as can be seen in the bottom right 
graph in Figure 4, and the stochastic process we used takes random pulls from the distribution of 
that process to generate log returns for the next time step in order to calculate the asset price. 
Following Brigo et al. (2009), we used the returns level data to calibrate the parameters for each 
of the stochastic processes (GBM, NGARCH and Jumps Diffusion) using maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE). In general, MLE selects parameter values which produce the distribution from 









































































which the sample data was most likely taken. This is akin to fitting a set of a data to a 
hypothesized distribution by changing its variance, skewness, kurotosis, and any other 
parameters that determine the shape of the distribution. Table 2 summarizes the calibrated 
parameters, as well as the p-values for each model. The p-values are calculated using a two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which tests the null hypothesis that the historical returns and 
simulated returns come from the same distribution. Using the commonly accepted 5% 
significance level, p-values below 0.05 cause us to reject the null hypothesis. In other words, if 
the p-value is less than 0.05 for a particular stochastic process, we can say that the historical 
values and the values simulated using that process does not come from the same distribution, and 
that the process is not a good representation of how asset prices behave. Higher p-values suggest 
a greater likelihood that the two samples are from the same distribution. These values, along with 
quantile-quantile plots discussed below, will enable us to determine which process is most 
appropriate for EUAs during the time period examined. Finally, using the historically calibrated 
parameters, we simulated 10,000 paths for each process for a time period of 10 years (2500 time 
steps), starting at a price of €15.20. 
Goodness of fit to a particular process can be assessed using a quantile–quantile plot (QQ 
plot) (Brigo et al., 2009). The y-axis plots the quantiles of the historical EUA returns and the x-
axis plots the quantiles of the distribution of the simulated returns for a particular process. If it is 
a good fit to the historical data, then the QQ-plot approximates a straight line. However, if the 
plot diverges from a straight line, then the stochastic process fails to capture all of the properties 




Figure 5. QQ plots of EUA returns versus simulated returns. 
 
In evaluating the QQ plots, it is important to concentrate on the portion of the distribution 
critical to the analysis being performed. Referring back to the structure of the carbon revenue 
bond discussed earlier in the paper, the risk to the renewable energy developer is that the future 
revenues from RECs, carbon credits, or other financial incentives are inadequate to cover the 
debt obligation to the investor (the original bond purchaser). As a result, the lower left quadrant 
of the graph should be studied in order to find a model that most accurately predicts potential 
downside risks. We see that all models are good estimators of EUAs given data from September 
1, 2009 to August 31, 2010 with the exception of one data point. This corresponds to the outlier 
in the returns of historical prices which is visible on the histogram of returns data on the lower 
right graph of Figure 4. However, the Jumps Diffusion simulation places this point closest to the 
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line. Referencing Table 2, we observe that the p-values are all above 0.05, with the Jumps 
Diffusion model giving the highest p-value of 0.70864, providing quantitative support for our 
visual inspection. Weighing these factors, we can conclude that, out of the three models tested, 
the Jumps Diffusion process best approximates EUA prices given data from the time period 
examined. 
Now we use the simulations from the Jumps Diffusion process to price a carbon revenue 
bond to finance a hypothetical 200MW wind power plant located in Europe. The European Wind 
Energy Association provides a rough estimate of the average cost at €1000 per kW of capacity 
(Morthorst, 2004), making the total cost of development for our wind plant €200 million. 
The first step is to estimate the amount electricity produced and the amount of potential 
carbon savings for which the developer would receive credits. Assuming an average capacity 
factor of 30% each year,5 the average amount of electricity produced by the wind farm is 
525,600MWh per year. The Carbon Trust recommends a conversion factor of 0.43t of CO2 
saved per MWh of electricity produced for all renewable technologies, providing the developer 
with 226,008 credits yearly. We assume that the credits are sold at the end of each year, although 
developers are free to choose their own trading strategy. For each path of the Jumps Diffusion 
simulation, we multiply each year-end value by the number of credits to calculate the expected 
revenue per year. Finally, we take the present value of each path assuming a discount rate of 7% 
to determine the value of the carbon revenue bond. 
In fact, what we end up with is a bond price for each path, in our case 10,000 values. 
Each of these represents one possible scenario under the assumption that the price of EUAs 
follows a Jumps Diffusion model. We take the median value of €30.2 million as the price of our 
                                                          
5 Typical capacity factors for wind are between 20 and 40%. 
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carbon revenue bond for this particular wind project. This securitized cash stream can be sold to 
one party or broken up for sale to multiple parties, each one having a claim to a percentage of 
future EUA revenues. In this case, the bond or bonds are able to finance 15.1% of initial project 
costs. The histogram of simulated total bond values can be found on the left in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Histogram of bond value and histogram of expected return for EUAs. 
 
As mentioned before, an advantage of stochastic modeling is the ability to not only 
determine a bond value, but also perform quantitative risk analysis. The histogram provides the 
probability distribution of the bond value. The upper and lower quartiles have also been 
calculated, showing that there is a 25% chance the future revenue will be less €20 million and a 
25% chance that it will be more than €46.2 million. Most of the time, investors are concerned 
with their rate of return given the initial investment amount. Using the median bond value, we 
calculated the internal rate of return (IRR) for each simulated path, as well as the quartiles. We 
are also able to quantify the risk of losses (negative returns) by finding the probability that the 
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IRR is less than zero. In this example, the risk is very high at 28.59%. Many investors may walk 
away from this investment or ask for a higher return to compensate for the additional risk. 
Methods of risk mitigation are discussed later. The histogram of all IRR values is presented on 
the right in Figure 6. Details are also provided in Table 3. 
 
Australian RECs 
Australia has implemented the use of RECs to help meet the country’s renewable energy 
target.6 Unlike the EUAs, Australian RECs are not traded daily on an exchange but rather only 
through over-the-counter transactions. We use data collected by Local Power based on 
information they have received over the last few years from various brokers. The time period we 
analyze ranges from January 4th 2010 to December 22nd 2010. Since information is provided 
only from certain brokers, we do not have recorded trades for everyday during the analysis 
period and spline interpolation is used to fill in the gaps. Figure 7 includes graphs of asset price 
after interpolation, asset returns, and their respective histograms. 
 
                                                          
6 Starting January 1, 2011, the Renewable Energy Target (RET) was divided into Large-scale Renewable Energy 
Targets (LRET) and the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) with qualifying technologies using Small-




Figure 7. Time series and histograms of Australian REC prices and log returns. 
 
We follow the same process used above to calibrate parameters for the stochastic 
processes, simulate future prices and determine the best fitting process using QQ plots and the p-
value from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The results are detailed in Figure 8 and 
Table 2. The Jumps Diffusion model appears to have the best fit in the QQ plot, which is 
supported by the p-value of just over 0.05. Histograms of the historical returns and simulated 
returns shown in Figure 9 are provided for this example as additional validation for the choice of 











Figure 9. Histogram of historical and simulated Australian REC prices. 
 
Again, we use a 200MW hypothetical wind farm and estimate that the project will cost 
AU$ 350 based on a similarly sized project currently being developed. We use the simulations 
from the Jumps Diffusion process to price a carbon revenue bond for Australian RECs following 
the same methodology as before. However, this time the amount of electricity generated 
translates directly into the number of RECs received. A 200 MW wind farm, therefore, produces 
525,600MWh of electricity yearly based on a 30% capacity factor and is awarded 525,600 RECs 
per year. The histogram of simulated revenue bond prices is shown in Figure 10. On average, the 
bond can contribute AU$ 127 million (36.3%) to finance capital costs. Analysis of IRR based on 
the median bond value places the risk of loss at 20.19% and details of risk analysis can be found 





Figure 10. Histogram of bond value and histogram of expected return for Australian RECs. 
 
New Jersey SRECs 
The RPS in New Jersey has a specific solar carve-out, requiring that at least 5316 GWh 
of electricity sold by suppliers/providers to retail customers is sourced from solar technologies 
within the state. To facilitate this goal, solar RECs (SRECs) are award to energy producers who 
subsequently sell them to electricity suppliers in an unbundled SREC market. 
Similar to the Australian RECs, there are no exchanges on which the credits are traded so 
over-the-counter trades facilitate all transactions. The market is relatively small compared to our 
previous two examples because of geographical boundaries. Thus, trade volumes are low and do 
not happen daily. The data we used comes from the state of New Jersey Clean Energy Program 
website and consists of monthly averages from December 2008 to September 2011 calculated 
based on prices reported by registered SREC account holders. With only 34 data points, the 
calibration of the stochastic models will not be as rigorous as the previous two examples and the 
results should be analyzed with that in mind. Additionally, since we only have monthly data, it is 
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imprudent to interpolate to daily prices. Therefore we evaluate prices changes on a monthly 
basis, using 120 time steps to cover a ten year period. 
To keep the market in check, New Jersey has implemented an Alternative Compliance 
Payment (ACP) which electricity suppliers must pay if they do not have enough SRECs. The 
ACP was set at $711 in 2009 and declines yearly according to a set schedule until it reaches $594 
in 2016. Rational electricity providers will not purchase an SREC with a price higher than the 
ACP since it will be in their best interest to just pay the fine. Therefore when we simulate future 
SREC prices, we also cap them at the APC. The QQ plots are contained in Figure 11 and the p-
values are summarized in Table 2. The p-values indicate that none of the models tested are above 
0.05 and can approximate SREC prices at the 5% confidence level. At this point, more stochastic 
processes should be tested to find a better fit, but for illustrative purposes we will continue our 





Figure 11. QQ plots of NJ SREC returns versus simulated returns with price cap. 
 
Because of generous net-metering laws that allow customers to sell electricity back to the 
grid, roof-installed systems on residential, commercial and industrial roofs are very common. 
Thus our hypothetical system will be much smaller at 200kW and cost $1.1 million based on the 
per watt cost of $5.5 cited in a recent Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory report (Barbose et 
al.,2011). The capacity factor for solar PV is much smaller than that of wind and we use an 
estimate of 18% for our example. Additionally, the conversion of DC watts (units of PV system 
size) into AC watts (units that qualify for SRECS) occurs around 95% efficiency. Combining 
both of them translates to 300 SRECs received per year. We use the same methodology as before 
to calculate bond prices, this time using simulations based on GBM. The histogram of simulated 
revenue bond prices is shown in Figure 12. On average, the bond contribution of US$ 1.26 
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million exceeds the total capital costs. The developer will not raise more money than necessary 
so we assume he sells US$ 1.1M worth of bonds, corresponding to 87.3% of future SREC 
revenue obligations, of US$ 1.1M. Next we isolated all simulated paths for which the return was 
under 7%. We then increased the yearly revenue for those paths to reflect that sales from all 300 
SRECs will be used for repayment. If, for a particular path, the additional SRECs are able to 
increase the IRR to7%orhigher, we count the return as 7%. Otherwise, it will still be lower than 
the target return despite the added revenue. Our simulation shows that the risk of losses is 0%. 
(To be exact, 2 simulations out of our 10,000 gave negative returns) and that the risk of earning 
less than the expected IRR is only14.92%, compared with 50% without the safety netofextra 
revenue. The histogram of rate of return is shown in Figure 12 and details of risk analysis can be 
found in Table 3. 
 
 






Table 2. Summary of Model Parameters. 
 
  GBM NGARCH Jumps Diffusion 
EUA 
Parameters 
µ = 1.2633e-4 
σ = 2.0633e-2 
µ = 1.1848e-4  
ω = 3.3578e-4 
α = 0.19643 
β = 1.2817e-2 
γ = 1.2150e-2 
µ* = 1.3639e-4  
σ = 1.9695e-2 
λ = 1.1342e-2 
λμ = -4.4822e-2 
λσ = 3.4943e-2 




µ = 9.9289e-5 
σ = 1.5665e-2 
µ = 1.1754e-4  
ω = 1.6345e-4 
α = 0.19631 
β = 1.2813e-2 
γ = 1.2173e-2 
µ* = 9.9255e-5  
σ = 9.4618e-4 
λ =0. 9576 
λμ = 1.2567e-4 
λσ = 1.4321e-2 





µ = 1.1088e-2 
σ = 2.2330e-2 
µ = 1.0895e-2  
ω = 4.3802e-4 
α = 0.11151 
β = 1.2432e-2 
γ = 2.3645e-2 
µ* = 1.1096e-2  
σ = 1.8321e-2 
λ =3.2379e-2 
λμ = -7.2046e-2 
λσ = 2.8944e-5 










Table 3. Results of illustrative examples and risk analysis. 
 
  





New Jersey SRECs 












Lower Quartile (Q1) 







Upper Quartile (Q3) 

















Risk of loss (%)** 28.59 20.19 0*** 
 
*Based on median bond value 
**Negative return on investment 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
These illustrative examples reveal that sale of a carbon revenue bond can help finance a 
meaningful portion of the initial capital cost of renewable energy infrastructure as summarized in 
Table 3. The median bond value or the average amount of revenue expected from ten years of 
credit sales ranges from 15.1% to 115% of initial costs. This is not insignificant considering that 
current treasury grants cover up to 30% of development costs. The upper and lower quartiles 
signify the range in which the amount of revenue collected could fall. In other words, there’s a 
50% chance that future revenue will fall between the lower and upper quartile range. The same 
as been done for expected return, and investors can use that as a measure of risk. For example, 
the EUAs show the widest range, indicating a greater probability that revenue received will be 
different than initial investment and returns different than anticipated. The SRECs, on the other 
hand, have the smallest range, and hence a lower chance that future revenue will drastically vary 
from the initial bond value. The risk of loss calculated here represents the chance that the rate of 
return is negative, or the investment loses money. Investors may also wish to calculate the risk of 
returns below a certain threshold, such as 5%, in order to make careful decisions about how 
much risk they are willing to carry. Again, it should be noted that historical data for SRECs are 
limited and the results should be taken with that in mind. The examples are only intended as a 
demonstration of how to price a carbon revenue bond. 
Since developers of non-renewable energy sources do not have access to the revenue 
stream from environmental credits, renewable energy developers who use this tool effectively 
decrease the cost of electricity production to help compete with conventional, cheaper generation 
methods such as coal or natural gas. A carbon revenue bond enhances regulatory measures and 
the markets that develop around them, such as RPS and REC trading, respectively. These 
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policies do not directly help developers overcome the high initial cost of infrastructure as credits 
are awarded after the start of electricity production. Our idea of a carbon revenue bond 
securitizes the future revenue streams to provide a developer funds up-front, thus effectively 
defraying the high initial cost of development. In our hypothetical example involving New Jersey 
SRECs, a carbon revenue bond can finance up to 100% of capital costs. It is also an 
improvement on current US national, state or local level incentives including production credits, 
tax credits, and grants that expire quickly relative to the project life of renewable energy 
infrastructure. Studies have shown that the presence and expiration of PTCs have contributed to 
fluctuations in wind development, especially in Texas (Bird et al., 2005; Bolinger et al., 2009). 
Despite this, five out of the six primary financing structures used for wind development depend 
on tax equity investors (Bolinger et al., 2009). Although initially such structures were successful, 
the financial downturn has drastically lessened the pool of available and interested developers 
(Schwabe et al., 2009). Regulatory measures that do not involve direct government handouts but 
instead rely on market players to incentivize each other, such as RPS and carbon caps, tend to 
expire less quickly, as is the case with the three locations presented in our illustrative examples. 
It is reasonable to assume that the existence of markets for environmental credits surrounding 
these measures, and therefore the carbon revenue bond, is more stable relative to other 
government incentives. Because carbon revenue bonds can be used in conjunction with other 
incentives, developers can take advantage of all financing opportunities concurrently. It is also 
important to point out that a carbon revenue bond may be a cheaper financing tool for renewable 
energy projects than currently used structures. It is often cited that the cost of debt is lower than 
the cost of equity. Literature has shown that development of the same wind project using 
different financing structures leads to different levelized costs of electricity (Wiser, 1997). Future 
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research can extend this analysis to include a carbon revenue bond in the cash flow models in 
order to quantitatively determine the potential savings. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned advantages, the carbon revenue bond carries an 
inherent amount of risk since future environmental credit prices cannot be known with 100% 
certainty. To predict future prices, we employ stochastic models which are commonly used for 
tradable assets (Schwartz, 1997). One major advantage of this method is that the inputs come 
only from historical data and not from assumptions of other variables, but the authors 
acknowledge the wide-spread use of other models as well. It should be noted that different 
renewable energy incentive schemes are best approximated by different processes. Even 
identically structured and operated RPS schemes in neighboring US states may have REC prices 
that are best forecast using different models. The behavior of the same environmental credit will 
also change over time. It is wise for developers to re-calibrate model parameters and test 
different models for each new project in the pipeline based on the most recent data available on 
the prices of the credits they expect to receive. As markets become more mature, improved 
models can be built to better forecast environmental credit prices. 
Nevertheless, simulating prices using a stochastic process allows developers and 
investors to quantifiably evaluate the risk of the bond. That is, simulation results produce a mean 
number for the value of the bond, but also a distribution around that mean, so that the probability 
of loss can be calculated as was shown in our illustrative examples. While the inherent risk in a 
carbon revenue bond cannot be eliminated, only reduced, the remaining risk can be properly 
allocated across project participants. As presented in this paper, the structure of the bond places 
all of the risks and attributes all financial windfalls on the bond buyer, as future revenues, 
whatever they may be, are passed- through directly from the owner to the investor. If future 
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prices are higher than projected, the bond will have been undervalued. The investor benefits 
financially from the extra proceeds, earning a much higher return than expected. Conversely, if 
future prices are lower than expected, then the bond has been overvalued and the investor will 
not receive the desired return on the bond. 
Altering the structure of the bond is a good way to spread risk between the buyer and the 
seller of the bond. Introducing a coupon into the bond structure with the majority of repayment at 
maturity—this is how Treasury bills and many municipal bonds are structured—gives the owner 
the opportunity to invest revenue collected, which can mitigate some of the risk of lower than 
expected credit prices. Revenue from electricity sales can be used to hedge potential losses if not 
pledged to other lenders, effectively transferring price risk to the owner, but limited to the 
amount of electricity sales. This is a similar situation that we encountered in the illustrative 
example from New Jersey where left over SRECs were used to decrease the riskiness of the bond 
by a significant amount. Additionally, embedding options to exit the bond or renegotiate terms if 
future prices are drastically different than anticipated can ensure an investor return that is close 
to the expected return. Decreasing bond maturity can also decrease risk, as prices further into the 
future contain more uncertainty. This may be a good strategy for high-value environmental 
credits which provide a large portion of initial development costs if securitized, as is the case in 
the SREC example. Future research should examine the applicability of different bond structures 
as a risk allocation tool between the bond buyer and the bond seller in the context of a carbon 
revenue bond. Future research should also assess the relevance of the carbon revenue bond in 
differing market economies, most notably developing ones. Many countries qualify for the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol for which certificates are issued for 
an avoidance of additional carbon emissions as these countries grow. However, the electricity 
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markets of these countries need to be studied to make sure the use of a project carbon revenue 
bond is appropriate and consistent with the way public infrastructure projects are delivered. 
Implemented well, the carbon revenue bond may promote increased renewable energy 
development, which is a critical part of the solution to the rise in global energy demand and need 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Renewable energy development makes up 21% of the effort 
proposed by the International Energy Agency (2008) as being needed to meaningfully reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Future research on the carbon revenue bond and other stable financing 
mechanisms that reward the positive externality of reducing greenhouse gas emissions are 
needed for the research community to play an active role in increasing investments in renewable 
energy infrastructure. In doing so, researchers can help by providing sustainable solutions to 







STRATEGIC STRUCTURE MATRIX: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR EXPLAINING THE IMPACT OF 
SUPERSTRUCTURE ORGANIZATIONS ON THE 




Increasing the use of renewables in the global energy mix has become a top priority for 
policy makers. In this paper, we use a diffusion theory based approach to analyze the impact of 
government initiatives on the development of wind energy infrastructure focusing on the specific 
case of wind energy diffusion in India. We propose a new framework—the strategic structure 
matrix—as a way to characterize the strategic focus and analyze the effectiveness of different 
initiatives to increase wind power diffusion. We apply the matrix to explain the different pace 
and paths of wind energy growth observed in five Indian states: Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka. Our findings suggest the importance of a 
comprehensive approach that includes multiple strategies across initiatives, local regulatory 
measures, and supply-side incentives. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Concerns over climate change and environmental pollution have placed a strong 
emphasis on increasing the share of renewable energy technologies (RETs) in the world’s energy 
                                                          
7 This paper was co-authored with Professor John E. Taylor and Professor Ashwin Mahalingam. It is currently in the 
revision process at Energy Policy. 
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mix. In the past decade, great strides have been made to develop and use renewables for 
electricity production, heating and cooling, and transportation. In 2010, renewable sources 
generated 16.7% of total energy consumed worldwide, and wind capacity alone has increased 
from 6.1 gigawatts in 1996 to 238 gigawatts in 2011 (REN21, 2012). However, as demand for 
energy continues to increase, especially in developing countries where it has historically 
outpaced supply, there is an urgent need for greater inclusion of RETs. 
The growth of renewable energy is aided by the policies and actions of various 
organizations, including local and national governments. However, some policy measures have 
led to greater development of renewable energy infrastructure than others, and the impact of the 
same initiative in different cities, states or nations are far from identical. It is important to 
understand why and under what conditions certain strategies have met with success, in order to 
better inform policy makers on designing initiatives to increase renewable energy use. 
In this paper, we use a diffusion of innovation lens to analyze strategies used by 
organizations to promote diffusion. In the next section, we use past literature to develop a novel 
framework—the strategic structure matrix—to improve existing analysis of the impact of 
organizational initiatives on the pace of diffusion.  The explanatory value of the matrix is tested 
by examining the initiatives used by government organizations in India to promote the 
development of wind energy infrastructure from 1992 to 2011. Section 3 presents the research 
setting and methodology, which begins with a country-wide overview and then narrows focus to 
five states: Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. The results of our 
analysis of these five states are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 contains the 
contributions and limitations of the paper, and offers suggestions for future research. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
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ORGANIZATIONS AND DIFFUSION 
Using Rogers’ (2003) definition, diffusion is “the process in which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system” (Rogers, 
2003, pg 5). Innovations are ideas, processes and technologies that are perceived as new by an 
adopter. Communication channels may include mass media and word of mouth through social 
networks. Lastly, the social system comprises of members who may be potential adopters. Much 
of diffusion research seeks to understand the factors that lead to adoption or non-adoption of an 
innovation, often with the ultimate goal of learning how to make it diffuse more quickly. 
Research has shown that organizations, including governments, academic and research 
facilities, industry and trade associations, often play an important role in the diffusion of new 
technologies. For example, despite the prominence of Sony during the commercialization of the 
transistor radio in Japan, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade (MITI) and the 
government Electrotechnical Laboratories (ETL) helped establish a competitive market, diffused 
knowledge of the new technology, and demonstrated its technical capabilities before Sony 
entered the market (Lynn, 1998). These actions played a key role in successful diffusion. In 
another part of the world, a case study on the development and diffusion of biomass technologies 
in Austria identified fifteen organizations on the supply-side alone which shaped the spread of 
biomass boilers in the agricultural community, including the Chamber of Agriculture and the 
Regional Energy Association as two of the most influential (Rohracher, 2002). Their “intense 
promotional and networking efforts” were crucial in jump-starting diffusion during the initial 
phases. The next logical question is then, what is it about these organizations that make their 




Innovation community framework  
While many empirical studies examine organizations’ involvement in diffusion, Lynn et 
al. (1996) found that there existed no analytical framework for identifying how relevant 
organizations affect the rate of diffusion or the path of such diffusion. Borrowing from the ideas 
of organizational ecology to find the boundaries of organizations involved in diffusion, they 
created the “innovation community” framework which allows classification of organizations into 
superstructure and substructure organizations. Substructure organizations are producers of the 
innovation or its technological components. They perform almost all economic research on the 
innovation. Superstructure organizations coordinate the flow of information and activities within 
the innovation community. They are usually non-market entities and include governments, 
research institutions, and professional or trade associations. Superstructure organizations are 
generally taken for granted in the literature on the diffusion process (Reddy and Rao, 1990) and 
therefore have not received much scholarly attention. In this paper, we will focus our attention 
on superstructure organizations and their role in diffusing renewable energy technologies. 
Past research has shown that certain characteristics of a superstructure organization can 
determine its effectiveness in promoting innovation diffusion. Some characteristics include size, 
heterogeneity within the organization, basis of authority, level of centralization, and purpose 
(Howells, 2006; Lynn et al., 1996). Referring to the case studies mentioned earlier, the Chamber 
of Agriculture was able to take the role of a “system builder” in diffusing biomass technology in 
Austria because of its high basis of authority and its ability to influence other organizations 
(Rohracher, 2002). The success of Japan’s ELT in aiding the commercialization of the transistor 
radio can be attributed to its purpose of advancing new technologies and leasing patents to 
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various firms (Lynn, 1998). If the transistor had been developed by a single firm, it is unlikely 
that technical knowhow would have propagated as rapidly as it did. 
While useful, analyzing a superstructure organization’s characteristics does not singularly 
explain how it accelerates diffusion. A single organization may be involved in the diffusion of 
several innovations but with varied success, perhaps because of the different actions it chooses to 
take regarding each one. For example, India’s Ministry of New and Renewable Energy recently 
had many initiatives to promote development of both wind and solar power. Despite findings that 
its initiatives contributed to early growth of wind energy (Rao and Kishore, 2009), analysis of 
the 2003 National Solar Mission found that it slowed growth of solar industries in certain areas 
and predicts that it will negatively impact future diffusion of decentralized solar applications 
(Harish and Raghavan, 2011; Raghavan et al., 2010). Additionally, superstructure organizations 
with similar traits may have different success with their initiatives. Therefore it is also important 
to look at the specific actions of superstructure organizations and the strategies they use in aiding 
innovation diffusion. 
 
Increasing the focus on strategy 
Few researchers have examined the strategic focus of initiatives employed by 
superstructure organizations and their role in innovation diffusion. After reviewing existing 
literature, the authors have identified five key categories of strategies: lowering a diffusion 
barrier, empowering an actor type, enabling an environment necessary for diffusion, targeting the 
technology or the support infrastructure, and affecting supply or demand. We now describe each 




Lowering a diffusion barrier  
Data collected during a 2012 interview with a researcher from the World Resources 
Institute classified the three major barriers to technological diffusion as technological, financial 
and regulatory. Technological barriers prevent a new technology and its support infrastructure 
from functioning properly or adapting to local conditions. Additionally, “technological lock-ins” 
can occur, in which the dominance of incumbent technologies prevent wide-spread use of 
innovative technologies (Foxon and Pearson, 2008). Funding for research and developing 
demonstration projects would be examples of initiatives aimed at overcoming technical hurdles. 
Financial barriers are ones in which the cost of or access to capital limit the commercialization of 
a technology for wide-spread use. Wind power in India is a more expensive technology for 
electricity production than many of its competitors, including fossil fuel-based generation 
methods, giving it a competitive disadvantage (Sargsyan et al., 2010). A United Kingdom case 
study also found evidence that the promotion of innovation is at odds with the economic 
efficiency of existing technology (Foxon and Pearson, 2008). Tax credits or access to low 
interest loans correct this disadvantage and reduce financial barriers for developers. Lastly, 
regulatory barriers slow down the diffusion process from a legal and/or political standpoint. 
Streamlining the approval process for adoption of a new technology or lifting a previous ban are 
both initiatives with the strategy of lowering regulatory barriers. 
A recent World Bank report (Sargsyan et al., 2010) identified several remaining barriers 
to wide-spread adoption of wind energy infrastructure in India. Similar to the barriers discussed 
above, there are three main categories—financial viability, regulatory approvals, and support 
infrastructure. While the technological capability of wind turbines themselves have advanced 
over the past couple of decades, inadequate surrounding support infrastructure such as 
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substations and the electrical grid remain as technological barriers to diffusion. Therefore 
characterizing an initiative based on which diffusion barrier it overcomes the most is an 
important step in determining its strategic focus. 
 
Empowering actors 
In addition to overcoming a diffusion barrier, initiatives from superstructure 
organizations can empower different types of actors in the diffusion community. A comparative 
analysis on regional innovation policies in seventeen Spanish regions (Fernandez de Lucio et al., 
2010) found three types of strategies, each emphasizing different actors in the innovation 
community. The linear strategic model posits that innovation starts in a laboratory and eventually 
moves into a self-created market for commercialization. Policies adhering to this model, for 
example funding research laboratories, empower people and organizations working on the 
research and development of the innovation. The second type of strategy places emphasis on 
systems and market infrastructure, with policies promoting actors involved in creating a sound 
supporting network around the innovation, including intellectual property regulations, and 
market competition. The third type recognizes the importance of mutual knowledge and learning 
processes. Policies are aimed at coordinating activities between members of the diffusion 
community to strengthen ties and promote knowledge sharing. An R&D and innovation indicator 
was also calculated for each of the seventeen regions. While most regions are using policies 
defined best as the linear model, three out of the four regions with the highest R&D and 
innovation indicators have policies targeted mainly at increasing mutual knowledge and learning, 
suggesting a greater effectiveness over other types of strategies. Consistent with this finding, the 
linear model is increasingly being abandoned in favor of a more dynamic view of innovation 
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(Foxon and Pearson, 2008). In adding this category to the diffusion barriers discussed earlier, we 
provide an extra dimension through which to view initiative strategies. 
 
Creating an enabling environment 
Some researchers suggest certain enabling environments are precursors to successful 
diffusion. We identify and classify three types of strategies from past literature to this end: 
allowing for institutional change, creating or expanding markets, and formation or strengthening 
of advocacy coalitions. In one study, Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) examined the diffusion of 
wind turbines and solar cells in Germany. This was the first empirical study of an earlier 
framework (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004), which postulated that four conditions are necessary to 
promote renewable energy growth: institutional change, market creation, advocacy coalitions and 
entrance of new firms. In this paper, we have combined market creation and entrance of new 
firms into one strategy category as both bring new players into the market, just at different times 
during the diffusion process. The empirical study found that all four conditions were present, 
even if weakly, in the initial phase of diffusion for both wind and solar. Demonstration projects, 
for example, enabled new markets to form by boosting private sector participation. A feedback 
loop was also identified in which the results of one strategy led to subsequent promotion of other 
strategies. For example, the new markets created from the demonstration projects led to more 
influential advocacy coalitions, which in turn lobbied for better legislation to create institutional 
change. These enabling environments are relevant to any of the diffusion barriers and 
empowered actors detailed above, adding yet another level of detail to characterization of 




Direct or indirect influence 
Systematic innovations like centralized wind power depend on support infrastructure 
such as substations and the electrical grid in order to operate. Some initiatives intended to help 
diffusion of the innovation actually bolster the support infrastructure. Research has identified the 
importance of such infrastructure for wind power and renewable energy more broadly as well 
(Brown and Hendry, 2009; Sargsyan et al., 2010). Including this difference allows us to include 
initiatives which target support networks for a new innovation but ultimately lead to higher rates 
of adoption of the innovation itself.  For example, as we will discuss later in the case study, 
Maharashtra addressed financial issues of complementary infrastructure such as substations and 
access roads to encourage increases to wind energy capacity. We therefore classify actions in this 
strategy category as “direct” or “indirect” to indicate whether the initiative in question affects the 
innovation directly, or indirectly through support infrastructure. 
 
Demand or supply 
Literature has also classified initiatives as either acting on the demand side or the supply 
side. Brown and Hendry (2009) analyzed government programs which promoted diffusion of 
photovoltaic in the US, Japan, and Europe, and refer to the “technology-push/market-pull” nature 
of government policy. Similarly, in his study of the growth of wind energy in California in the 
1980s and 1990s, Nemet (2009) separated government strategies into “demand-pull” and 
“technology-push” actions. Demand-pull actions are those that raise the pay-off for successful 
innovations, including tax credits and rebates, technology mandates and direct government 
procurement of the technology. Technology-push initiatives reduce costs associated with 
innovation, including funding research and development, easing knowledge exchange and setting 
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up demonstration projects. Nemet (2009) shows that the timing of diffusion coincides with the 
period when generous tax credits were available to developers in California. Combined with 
evidence that unsubsidized wind energy production was not profitable until the 2000s while the 
bulk of capacity was installed in the mid-1980s, he finds support for the favorable effect of 
demand-pull policies on wind power diffusion. However, several of these demand-pull policies 
were enacted by the US federal government and applied to all states. There may be variations in 
state policies which have led to diverse diffusion patterns for wind power in different states. 
Texas, for example, experienced its wind boom much later. 
 
Formulation of the strategic structure matrix 
While past studies have identified and examined strategies used by organizations to speed 
up diffusion, they do not simultaneously characterize different categories of strategies. For 
example, an initiative that lowers a financial barrier to diffusion can simultaneously increase 
demand for the technology, yet no framework exists to analyze these two characteristics 
concurrently. Therefore in order to synthesize the disparate studies mentioned above and to 
provide greater insight into the effect of various strategies used by superstructure organizations 
on innovation diffusion, we formulated a strategic structure matrix in order to describe the 
actions of superstructure organizations. Table 4 displays the matrix and explains the different 
characterizations, which have been adapted from previous literature on diffusion and 
technological change. 
Each initiative can be described by a combination of five strategies—its strategic 
structure—one from each category. A demonstration project, for example: overcomes technical 
barriers; empowers people/institutions involved in research and development; helps create a new 
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market; directly targets the technology in question; and acts on the supply side of diffusion. By 
using a matrix instead of a one-dimensional analysis as in previous studies, we are able to gain a 
more nuanced understanding of the characteristics of initiatives used to promote diffusion and 
their outcomes. The classification offered by the strategic structure matrix will better explain 
why certain initiatives succeed while others do not, and also help build theory on which 
combinations of strategies are most effective with respect to renewable energy technologies. Our 
purpose in developing this new framework is to address the gap in existing literature and to 
better understand how to effectively develop policy aimed at increasing the speed of diffusion of 
renewable energy technologies. 
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RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS 
Strategic structure matrix case study 
The application of this matrix can help address the broader question of how 
superstructure organization strategies affect the diffusion of technologies. As a step in this 
direction, we test our matrix by performing a case study of the growth of wind energy in India 
and analyze the differences in the strategic structure of initiatives used by various superstructure 
organizations in the diffusion community, and their outcomes. More specifically, we investigate 
the actions of the Central Government and five state governments which have positively affected 
the growth of wind power in India. Government organizations are a subset of superstructure 
organizations in general. They are unique in their ability to bring regulatory authority and 
legitimacy behind the incentives they offer. We focus on incentives by governments and their 
related organizations in this paper to control for the level of authority an organization has when 
trying to increase innovation diffusion. We aim to discover: 1) if better characterization offered 
by the strategic structure matrix can explain the fast growth of wind energy in some states and 
the slow growth in others; and 2) the relative effectiveness of strategies or combinations of 
strategies in promoting wind energy diffusion in India. In doing so, we hope to pinpoint 
favorable strategic structures in order to guide future actions of superstructure organizations 
concerned with diffusing renewable energy. 
 
Case study setting – wind power in India 
In 1983, the Ministry of Non-conventional Energy Sources (MNES) (currently the 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE)) started the Wind Energy Programme under 
the Central Government of India with the broad goals of assessing wind resources, building 
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demonstration projects and creating industry-utility partnerships (Bhattacharya and Jana, 2009; 
Pillai and Banerjee, 2009; Rajsekhar et al., 1999). Since then, this and other initiatives have 
helped wind energy grow considerably and India currently ranks fifth in installed capacity 
worldwide. Even its potential seems to grow. A recent study by Lawrence Berkley National 
Laboratory (Phadke, 2011) reassessed the wind energy potential in India and found it to be much 
higher than previous estimates, suggesting additional room for expansion. The study also found 
that ninety-five percent of India’s wind power potential lies in five states: Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. 
While blessed with natural wind resources, these five states have had mixed success in 
harnessing its power for energy. Figure 13 shows how much of its wind power potential each 
state has harnessed through installation of wind turbines from 1992 to 2011. Diffusion theory 
postulates that when the adoption of an innovation is plotted against time, the resulting diffusion 
curve will be s-shaped (Rogers, 2003). It appears that all five states are still in the early phases of 
diffusion. Even so, the differences between the states can be clearly observed. For example, 
Tamil Nadu has consistently led development while Karnataka’s growth has lagged behind the 
rest. A divergence in the diffusion curves can be observed around 2004-2005, further suggesting 




Figure 13. Installed capacity of wind energy generators from 1992 to 2010-2011. 
 
Since individual states in India have a great deal of autonomy in managing their power 
sector, the differences in the growth of their wind energy may be in part due to variations in state 
level policies and strategies and how well those complement national incentives. After first 
identifying the initiatives used to encourage adoption of wind power, we use the strategic 
structure matrix as a tool to analyze the differences between them to examine whether the 
strategic structure of the initiatives can help explain similarities and differences in the patterns of 





Quantitative diffusion curve modeling 
The diffusion curves in Figure 13 were created using data from MNRE annual reports 
and information published by nodal agencies responsible for renewable energy in individual 
states. The raw data from those reports was used to determine the percentage of wind power 
potential achieved for each state as measured in a recent Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory 
report (Phadke, 2011) for fair comparative analysis.8 Table 5 lists the wind power potential for 
each state as well as additional information on state characteristics. Taken together, a state’s 
area, total population and percentage of urban population are indicators of its electricity needs; 
its per capita GDP is a proxy of its socio-economic progress. The states are comparable among 
these characteristics and also rank in the top half of all Indian states, suggesting that a single 
state’s success in achieving a higher percentage of its wind energy potential cannot be attributed 
to a greater demand for electricity or better socio-economic status.  
 










MW Rank [km2] Rank [millions] Rank [%] Rank [USD] Rank 
Tamil Nadu 131,500 2 130,058 11 72.1 7 44.0 3 1,587 9 
Gujarat 47,200 4 196,024  7 60.4 10 37.4 5 1,728 7 
Maharashtra 92,100 3 307,713 3 112.4 2 42.4 4 1,850 4 
Andhra Pradesh 17,600 5 275,045 4 84.7 5 27.3 10 1,527 11 
Karnataka 255,100 1 191,791 8 61.1 9 34.0 6 1,365 14 
 
Note: Rank indicates a state’s position among the 28 Indian states and 7 union territories in that category. 
 
                                                          
8 The wind power potential numbers used in this paper are the most conservative estimates, in which wind potential 




The yearly growth of installed capacity of wind power is also calculated in order to 












where  t = year. 
Figure 13 shows that additions to installed capacity stagnate around 1996 for all states before 
increasing again several years later. Additionally, previous literature has emphasized the 
importance of Central Government initiatives in the early years, and the promotional efforts by 
the states which led to increased wind energy development starting around 1999 (Bhattacharya 
and Jana, 2009). Therefore we separate the period of analysis into an earlier diffusion phase and 
a later diffusion phase for more detailed analysis. Since each state has a distinct pattern of 
diffusion and introduced state-specific initiatives to promote wind power development in 
different years, the start of the later phase varies. In order to determine the time periods of the 
later phase for each state, the Bass mixed-influence model (Bass, 1969; Mahajan and Peterson, 
1985) was used to find theoretical diffusion equations and curves based on empirical data of 
installed capacity.  
The Bass mixed-influence model describes diffusion over time as a function of both 
external and internal influences, represented mathematically using two coefficients, the 
coefficient of external influence and the coefficient of internal influence. It has been used in the 
past to model solar energy market penetration (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985). Graphically, the 
diffusion curve is s-shaped, with the rate of diffusion over time dependent on the coefficients, the 
total population of potential adopters, and the level of adoption at the start of the diffusion 
process. For the same values of potential adopters and initial level of adoption, faster diffusion is 
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represented by larger coefficients of internal and external influence. The model has a discrete 
solution of: 
 
     

























with  tN  = cumulative adoption installed at time t, 
0N  = level of adoption at beginning of diffusion, 
N  = population of potential adopters, 
a  = coefficient of external influence, 
b  = coefficient of internal influence, 
t  = time, 
and 
0t  = time at start of diffusion . 
 
Essentially, the Bass mixed-influence model is a three-parameter model: a, b, and N . 
The other inputs are provided by empirical data. In our case, we are also able to fix N  for each 
state by using the wind potential estimates from the Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory 
report (Phadke, 2011), reducing it to a two-parameter model, a and b, the coefficients of external 
and internal influence, respectively. Therefore only two data points per state are required to find 
the theoretical diffusion curves. Since we have more than two values, non-linear regression 
analysis was performed in MATLAB in order to find the parameter values that best fit the 
empirical data of installed capacity of wind energy. Residuals were also calculated to measure 
the goodness-of-fit of the theoretical diffusion curves to the empirical data. In order to determine 
the time period of the second phase of diffusion, different pairs of values of t0 and N0 were used 
to determine their associated diffusion curves with parameters a and b. The t0 resulting in the 
lowest residual between the empirical data and the theoretical curves was chosen as the starting 




Table 6. Time periods of the early and later phase of diffusion for each individual state. 
 
 Earlier Diffusion Phase Later Diffusion Phase 
Tamil Nadu 92 to 00-01 (9 years) 00-01 to 10-11 (10 years) 
Gujarat 92 to 01-02 (10 years) 01-02 to 10-11 (9 years) 
Maharashtra 92 to 02-03 (11 years) 02-03 to 10-11 (8 years) 
Andhra Pradesh 92 to 02-03 (11 years) 02-03 to 10-11 (8 years) 
Karnataka 92 to 01-02 (10 years) 01-02 to 10-11 (9 years) 
 
 
By separating the period of analysis into two phases, we are able to discover why the 
Central Government initiatives introduced in the initial diffusion phase had a greater impact in 
certain states. The lack of major initiatives applied at a national level in the later diffusion phase 
allows us to pinpoint state-specific strategies and how they impacted wind power growth in each 
of the five states individually.  
 
Qualitative data collection to complement diffusion curve analyses 
In order to determine central and state government initiatives that have positively 
influenced the development of wind energy, we first reviewed secondary sources on renewable 
energy in India, including scholarly articles, publicly available reports from government agencies 
and independent research institutions, and newspaper articles. A preliminary list of initiatives 
was compiled.  
Interviews were then conducted with the organizations responsible for creating the 
initiatives and the parties who subsequently used them to develop wind power. Interviewees 
included past and present government officials from MNRE, state nodal agencies, the Center for 
Wind Energy Technology, as well as major wind turbine manufacturers and energy developers. 
An effort was made to speak with government officials involved in wind power development 
from each state. For states where this was not possible, state-specific questions were asked to 
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officials who participated at a national level and interviews were conducted with researchers 
familiar with the wind energy sector of that state. The renewable energy technology 
manufacturers and developers interviewed have collectively operated in all of the five states 
studied. A total of twelve people were interviewed for a total of approximately thirty hours 
between October 2011 and May 2012 in India. Some were interviewed more than once. Copious 
notes were taken during the interviews and any questions were later clarified through email 
correspondence.  
The interviews helped clarify any inconsistencies in the aforementioned secondary 
sources and refine the preliminary list of initiatives to the one presented in this paper. 
Additionally, speaking with a wide variety of actors in the diffusion community helped offer a 
holistic view and decreased bias in the data collected. Information gathered during the interviews 
together with analysis of the secondary sources informed classification of observed initiatives 
using the strategic structure matrix. The results are shown in Table 7. In the initial phase, some 
states had promotional efforts in place to encourage wind energy development by the time 
national level incentives were introduced in the early 1990s. The collective strategies of central 
and state-level incentives are analyzed for each state in order to discover if similarities exist in 
the strategic patterns for states in which installed capacity of wind power increased during this 
period. The same is done for states in which wind development did not increase significantly, 
and differences between the strategic patterns of the two sets of states are also examined. In the 
later phase, the timings of the initiatives were compared to the diffusion curves and yearly 
growth curves to evaluate their effect, if any, on increasing wind power development and how 
their strategic structure may have had an impact. A strategic profile of all later phase initiatives is 
also provided for each state. In validating the explanatory value of the strategic structure matrix, 
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similar strategic patterns of initiatives enacted in different states at different times should have 
similar effects on the states’ diffusion curves at their respective times. 
 
Table 7: Initiatives to promote wind power and their strategic structures. 
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Initial diffusion phase 
In the early 1990s, development of wind energy infrastructure was primarily encouraged 
by the Central Government. The most frequently mentioned incentive is accelerated 
depreciation, in which developers can depreciate 100% (later decreased to 80%) of the value of 
wind generation assets in the first year of operation. With the allowance of private investment in 
electricity generation assets, many new parties entered the wind energy market to take advantage 
of accelerated depreciation in the early 1990s. Many of these developers were large corporations 
who were able to take advantage of the full tax benefits. In fact, a 1996 survey of wind 
developers found that a majority of wind developers were motivated primarily by tax savings 
(Pillai and Banerjee, 2009; Rajsekhar et al., 1999). The government also introduced low or no 
tariffs on imported wind energy generation technology and parts. Since technology was already 
being produced successfully in other countries, the tariff policy coupled with liberal foreign 
investment policies decreased the cost for developers when the domestic manufacturing industry 
was still nascent. Since wind power was new and relatively untested in India at this time, it was 
perceived as a risky investment by many banks. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency 
(IREDA) was established in 1987 to provide financing to developers of wind projects. The 
establishment of IREDA instilled confidence in the economic viability of wind power, and 
private banks later started lending to developers. 
However, even after accounting for wind energy potential, a disproportionate amount of 
developers chose to take advantage of the Central Government initiatives in Tamil Nadu and 
Gujarat, as shown in Figure 14. A clear gap is visible between the installed capacity in Tamil 
Nadu and Gujarat compared with the other three states in 1993-1994. We use the strategic 
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structure matrix to explain this difference. In Table 8, we mark the strategic areas covered by 
each individual state at the time the national incentives were introduced using an “X”. Each “X” 
represents one initiative. Similarly, we use a “Y” to mark the strategic areas covered by the three 
Central Government initiatives described above. 
 





Table 8. Strategies covered by various government initiatives in the early 1990s. 
 







Technical X X    
Financial YYY YYY YYY YYY YYY 
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Demand Y Y Y Y Y 
 
The top three categories of the strategic structure matrix are the most interesting. The two 
states that performed best in the early 1990s, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, had initiatives in place 
which collectively addressed almost all strategies in each category. Namely, they both had 
completed demonstration projects which proved that wind energy was technically viable, 
empowered the research and development of the technology, and created a market for wind (the 
end of demonstration projects in 1992 and 1993 by Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, respectively, meant 
that the state believed that the technology was ready for commercialization, i.e., private 
investment). Additionally, as a radically different technology for energy production, wind power 
is more likely to be adopted by new energy developers rather than the same developers of 
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traditional power generators (Lynn, 1998). It follows that the demonstration projects served as 
important market growth initiatives to draw new players into the energy market. Maharashtra, 
Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka had not yet under taken demonstration projects. In fact, 
Karnataka’s first demonstration project was not built until 2003, over twenty years after 
implementation of the initial Central Government initiatives. This finding is consistent with past 
literature. Brown and Hendry (2009) found that the success of financial incentives is dependent 
on technology readiness, which varied from state to state in India in the early 1990s. 
Additionally, Karnataka’s state nodal agency for renewables, Karnataka Renewable 
Energy Development Limited (KREDL), was not formed until 1996 following a Central 
Government order for states to set up nodal agencies to promote wind energy. Its counterparts, 
Tamil Nadu Energy Development Agency (TEDA), Gujarat Energy Development Agency 
(GEDA), Maharashtra Energy Development Agency (MEDA), and New and Renewable Energy 
Development Corporation of Andhra Pradesh (NEDCAP), were started much earlier (see Table 
7). According to the strategic structure matrix, formation of state nodal agencies decreases 
uncertainty about regulatory support, encourages mutual knowledge and learning, and creates a 
more favorable institutional environment. Although some of their actions may directly impact 
wind technology, their formation represents support for the surrounding infrastructure, which 
ultimately decreases non-financial costs for developing wind energy, for example, time spent 
navigating regulatory hurdles. 
The demonstration projects and the creation of state nodal agencies served as necessary 
support for usage of the Central Government financial incentives. Supporting past literature 
(Fernandez de Lucio et al., 2010; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006), Table 8 implies that incentives 
used to promote diffusion need to collectively cover all strategic areas in order to be successful. 
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This seems to hold especially true for a systemic innovation such as wind power. For example, in 
the “empowered actor” category of the strategic structure matrix, if research laboratories create 
an extremely efficient and inexpensive wind turbine and the state nodal agency shares and 
promotes it to energy developers, diffusion will be stunted if the supporting grid infrastructure is 
inadequate. The data also implies that advocacy coalitions may not be as critical during the initial 
phase of diffusion. 
 
Later diffusion phase 
Development of wind power slowed in 1996, which can be attributed to the introduction 
of the Minimum Alternative Tax (MAT). This tax required corporations to pay at least 12.9% tax 
on profits even if the depreciation of wind assets decreased taxes below that level. Effectively 
negating some of the benefits of accelerated depreciation, passage of the MAT caused investor 
interest to wane (Rajsekhar et al., 1999). Continued growth of wind energy infrastructure several 
years later can be attributed largely to individual state efforts (Bhattacharya and Jana, 2009) as 
well as the Electricity Act of 2003, which called for industry-wide reform of generation, 
transmission and distribution sectors (Bhattacharyya, 2005). Figure 15 plots yearly growth of 
installed capacity overlaid on top of cumulative installed capacity for the later phase, as defined 
previously in Table 6. With the exception of Karnataka, there is a general correlation between 
the presence of an initiative and increased growth one or two years later, since the highest values 
of percentage growth occur one or two years after a state enacts an initiative. Table 9 displays the 
strategic structure matrix for incentives introduced during the second phase of diffusion for all 












Table 9: Strategies covered by state government initiatives in the later phase of diffusion. 
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Tamil Nadu continued to lead wind power development during the later phase of 
diffusion, remaining the state with the highest percentage of potential achieved until around 
2008. It experienced peak growth in 2004-2005 of 50.12% after the state started granting 
permission for wind developers to set up captive generation plants using wind power.9 Although 
Gujarat enjoyed early success in the initial phase of diffusion, its growth stagnated around the 
turn of the century. This can be attributed to inconsistent or absent state policies regarding wind 
power during this time (Rao and Kishore, 2009). In 2007, however, the state introduced a 
comprehensive wind energy policy, followed by 81% growth in 2006-2007 and the 97% growth 
                                                          
9 Captive power plants are electricity generation plants set up by individuals or co-operative associations for use 
primarily for the individual or members of the association. 
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in 2007-2008. Shortly thereafter, it surpassed Tamil Nadu as the state which reached the highest 
percentage of its wind power potential in 2008-2009. 
Between the two states, differences in the strategic structure of their initiatives occur in 
three categories: empowered actor, direct versus indirect, and supply versus demand. While 
Tamil Nadu’s allowance of captive generation strengthened the overall system in which wind 
energy operates, provided indirect support and acted on the demand side, Gujarat’s 
comprehensive wind energy policy strengthened ties between different members of the wind 
diffusion community, directly applied to wind power and acted on the supply side. The higher 
growth values found in Gujarat’s wind power sector are consistent with a previous study which 
found that policies promoting mutual knowledge and learning are more effective (Fernandez de 
Lucio et al., 2010). They also suggest that direct initiatives acting on the supply side make a 
larger impact in diffusion. The lack of demand side measure used by the states in totality support 
the importance of acting on the supply side and reducing initial barriers to adoption of wind 
infrastructure. However, as systemic innovations, wind energy generators cannot act on their 
own, but require substations, transmission lines and distributions networks for electricity to reach 
users. Therefore while direct incentives may be more effective now, as wind technology 
continues to mature and become financially competitive with incumbent energy sources, we 
should expect more emphasis on addressing the challenges of providing proper support 
infrastructure. In fact, several of the experts and academics interviewed predict that India’s 
already strained electricity grid will be the next major bottleneck in the diffusion of renewable 
energy sources. 
In 2004, Maharashtra completed its last wave of demonstration projects, introduced a 
renewable energy policy, and also created a “green energy fund” that supplied capital for 
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supporting infrastructure such as transmission lines and access roads. Combined, these three 
initiatives covered a wide variety of strategies as evident in Table 9, including all barriers, 
empowered actors, two out of the three enabling environments, and addressed both wind 
technology as well as its support infrastructure. It is difficult to ignore their contribution to the 
120% growth in installed capacity in 2005-2006 followed by 48% growth in 2006-2007. In fact, 
Maharashtra had the highest growth percentage of a single year out of all states during the later 
diffusion phase. This further reinforces the notion that a comprehensive incentive package 
covering multiple strategic areas is necessary to impact diffusion, a trend observed during 
analysis of the first phase of diffusion. 
Andhra Pradesh finished its last demonstration project in 2004 and experienced 21.93% 
growth in 2004-2005. However, over the next several years, increases to installed capacity of 
wind infrastructure for the state are negligible. Only after it introduced a renewable energy 
policy in 2008 did diffusion pick up again, with the most recent percentage growth in 2010-2011 
measuring 40.72%. This finding may seem to contradict evidence that a comprehensive strategy 
profile from multiple incentives spurs diffusion, since completion of the demonstration projects 
combined with central and state government incentives from the initial period of diffusion cover 
almost all strategies represented by the strategic structure matrix, yet almost no new capacity was 
added in the following years. However, past studies have emphasized the feedback loop and 
virtuous cycle present in diffusion (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). For example, as technology 
matures and financial barriers are overcome, new regulatory issues may arise that need to be 
addressed. This can be observed by comparing Maharashtra’s diffusion trajectory with that of 
Andhra Pradesh, since both states had similar initial approaches to wind energy development. 
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Figure 16 isolates the diffusion curves of the two states and annotates the time of regulatory 
initiatives. 
 
Figure 16. Installed wind capacity for Maharashtra (M) and Andhra Pradesh (AP). 
 
Both had state nodal agencies established in 1986 and demonstration projects that 
spanned from 1994 to 2004. However, while Andhra Pradesh experienced growth levels 
comparable to Gujarat’s in terms of percentage of wind potential starting around 1995, 
Maharashtra’s wind energy market did not take off in a similar fashion. This discrepancy can be 
explained by Maharashtra’s lack of additional measures to overcome regulatory barriers, while 
Andhra Pradesh had wind estate laws which helped small developers acquire land for wind farms 
starting in the mid-nineties, echoing a broader change in land allotment policies for wind power 
(Jagadeesh, 2000). In the later phase of diffusion, the trend is reversed, with Andhra Pradesh’s 
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growth stagnating and Maharashtra’s development increasing and eventually outpacing Andhra 
Pradesh’s starting around 2005. The timing correlates with efforts by Maharashtra to introduce a 
comprehensive renewable energy policy, including a green energy fund, as discussed earlier. 
Predictably, diffusion increased after the government of Andhra Pradesh introduced their own 
renewable energy policy in 2008. 
Because Karnataka had experienced so little growth at the start of its later phase in 2001-
2002, a small addition to installed capacity constituted a large percentage, so the high numbers in 
the early years are quite misleading. In fact, an argument could be made that Karnataka is just 
finishing its initial period of diffusion relative to the other states. Its lateness in establishing a 
state nodal agency and starting its demonstration projects puts it about ten years behind. If we 
compare Karnataka’s installed capacity values and initiatives from 2002-2010 to Tamil Nadu’s 
from 1992-2000, we find the two states have very similar diffusion curves as well as strategic 
structures defined using the matrix. These findings provide internal validation that increases in 
installed capacity can be attributed to superstructure organization strategies and that the strategic 
structure matrix is an appropriate tool to analyze the relationship between initiatives and 
increased diffusion. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The case study on wind energy in India provides some important insights into the effect 
of the strategic structure of initiatives used to promote diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies. By linking the timing of initiatives used with increased growth in the diffusion 
curve, we provide evidence that differences in the strategic structure can help explain the 
variations in path and pace of diffusion for the five states studied. By creating and using the 
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strategic structure matrix as the framework for our analysis, we gain a deeper understanding into 
the nuances of strategies for diffusion and how they relate to one another. Additionally, our 
findings carry important policy implications for superstructure organizations within the 




We introduce a new framework—the strategic structure matrix—to improve upon past 
analysis of the relationship between organizations and innovation diffusion. Focusing our 
attention on superstructure organizations, defined by Lynn et al. (1996) as those that coordinate 
the flow of information and activities in an innovation community, we narrow our attention to 
the strategies used by organizations to promote diffusion. After reviewing past literature, we 
identified five main categories of strategies to describe an initiative: lowering a diffusion barrier, 
empowering an actor type, enabling an environment necessary for diffusion, targeting the 
technology or its support infrastructure, and acting on the demand or supply side. We used these 
categories to shape the strategic structure matrix in order to form a strategic profile of each 
initiative, composed of one strategy from each category. In providing a five-dimensional 
strategic structure instead a one-dimensional analysis as used in previous studies, we improved 
understanding of initiatives used to promote diffusion and provided guidance on how to better 
understand and develop effective policy measures to encourage use of renewable energy 
technologies. 
In order to test the applicability of the matrix, we performed a case study on the diffusion 
of wind energy infrastructure in the five Indian states of Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Maharashtra, 
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Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka. We found that framing initiatives in terms of their strategic 
structure helped successfully explain why some states were in a better position to take advantage 
of Central Government incentives in the early 1990s. Additionally, it was also able to identify 
reasons for continued growth of some states and not others in the later phase of diffusion. A 
noteworthy finding from this study is that the most successful states have a set of initiatives that 
cover almost all strategies within a category in the strategic structure. It also suggests that the 
effect of additional policy measures is dependent on the current incentive landscape for 
development of wind energy, and therefore targeting gaps in a state’s strategic structure may be 
most fruitful. For example, if several initiatives empower actors working to bolster R&D and 
support surrounding systems and infrastructure, but fail to include actors involved in knowledge 
sharing and mutual learning, then additional initiatives should address the missed strategic focus. 
 
Implications for policy 
Taken as a whole, the case study suggests that regulatory measures are more effective 
when enacted on a local level and supply-side measures are overwhelming favored. In India, the 
states have a large amount of autonomy when it comes to electricity. Thus, every state has 
unique regulatory challenges when it comes to increasing its capacity for wind energy depending 
on the existing laws and infrastructure. For example, the wind estate laws used in Andhra 
Pradesh would have had little impact in Tamil Nadu where liberal land policies already existed 
and much of the land used for wind power is private. Logically, regulatory measures should be 
considered by each state independently, an approach supported by a Central Government order 
for state governments to set up nodal agencies with their own rules and regulations for wind 
energy in 1995 (Jagadeesh, 2000). The importance of a local regulatory measure is further 
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illustrated during the comparison of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh and in Figure 16. 
Interestingly, the states often enact the same type of regulatory measure, such as creating a nodal 
agency for renewable energy, which all of them eventually did. While Tamil Nadu was the only 
state without a renewable energy policy at the completion of the case study, interviews with 
officials at TEDA indicate a policy is forthcoming. 
The importance of regional regulatory measures extends beyond the five Indian states 
studied. Financial and technical aspects of an innovation are more likely to remain constant over 
wider physical boundaries than the regulations associated with adoption. Although the fact that 
demonstration projects built in one state did not translate into broader adoption of wind power in 
neighboring states may suggest the technical aspect varies more than expected across 
geographical locations. Financial incentives seem best suited to be used on a broader 
geographical scope. The early initiatives by the Central Government to increase wind energy 
development were all financial in nature, and were most successful in states which had already 
addressed to some extent the technical and regulatory hurdles to diffusion. This finding provides 
insight to national governments and global alliances tasked with increasing renewable energy 
production and decreasing dependence on conventional fuel sources. For example, the United 
States debated instituting a national renewable portfolio system (RPS) to synchronize the variety 
in program design of many state RPS plans of the states that had an RPS, including a provision 
that 20% of the nation’s electricity come from renewable sources. It ultimately failed to pass. In 
light of this study, perhaps it was best to have left alone the states’ individual compliance 
percentages of how much electricity comes from renewable sources, since it is a regulatory 
measure. However, the credit trading markets associated with the RPS program may be more 
effective if they were national in nature, since the ability to sell renewable energy credits (RECs) 
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overcomes the financial burden of developing renewable energy. This arrangement was used by 
the nations who ratified the Kyoto protocol which aimed to decrease global levels of carbon 
emissions. In Europe, for example, each country had its own target decrease in emissions, but 
compliance certificates were traded between countries on the European Climate Exchange. 
Like most energy technology, wind systems require substantial upfront investment and 
have a long payback period. Although technological advances continue to decrease wind power 
production costs, it is still more expensive than coal- or gas-based generation in all of the five 
Indian states studied (Sargsyan et al., 2010). Initiatives that act on the supply side decrease the 
initial barriers to diffusion, financial or otherwise, and were overwhelming favored by the states 
and Central Government. It should be noted, however, that the ability to depreciate 100% of 
wind assets in their first year acted on the demand side since benefits could not be received until 
after installation, and was cited as a major reason for increased capacity in the early to mid-
1990s before the introduction of the MAT. A possible reason is that all the benefits are received 
almost immediately after installing new capacity, drastically decreasing the payback period in a 
similar way that supply-side measures do. 
 
Limitations and future research 
Although some important contributions have been made, some limitations to the 
proposed approach still exist. While less simplified than previous studies, the strategic structure 
matrix is still a simplification of a complex diffusion process with many inter-related 
superstructure and substructure organizations. Additionally, the case study does not provide 
enough data to do any statistical analysis to increase robustness of the findings shared above. 
Similarly, it cannot provide a comparative evaluation of the relative importance of one strategy 
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or category over the others. Continued research to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of 
certain strategies, for example, if a positive influence in one area may be canceled out by 
another, or if existence of one strategy is a necessary precursor for diffusion, will lead to a better 
understanding of the impact of initiatives. A broader perspective of the interactions of initiatives 
with one another and the larger power sector would also complement the analysis presented here. 
The links between wind energy diffusion and the growing numbers of actors in the power sector 
are not fully explored in this paper. The regional and global factors which affect investment 
interests in infrastructure in general and technological advancements will also shape the reaction 
of renewable energy investors. Additional research aimed to incorporate the strategic structure 
matrix into larger diffusion models can provide deeper insights into effective and efficient 
development of renewable energy. Nevertheless, our study is valuable as a first effort in 
demonstrating the use of the strategic structure matrix. 
Future research can address some of these limitations and advance understanding of 
strategic profiles used to impact diffusion. Superstructure organizations continue to play an 
important role as the wind energy sector grows in India. For example, in December 2009, the 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy started offering developers a choice between 
accelerated depreciation or a generation-based incentive of Rs 0.5 per kWh of electricity 
produced using wind energy. The authors chose not to include this incentive in the case study as 
not enough time has passed to evaluate its popularity or effect. However, future research can 
update diffusion curves and the strategic structure matrix started in this paper with additional 
data in order to provide more robust insights into how to shape future policies aimed at 
promoting diffusion. Additionally, similar case studies can be done in other geographical 
locations or on different types of innovations. Our case study dealt exclusively with governments 
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which have a higher basis of authority than other superstructure organizations. Analysis of other 
types of superstructure organizations may provide different insights on the relative importance of 
individual and combinations of strategies. Additional studies can further refine and validate the 
strategic structure matrix. 
While this paper took a diffusion-centric approach to strategies used by organizations, 
Lynn et al.’s (1996) original innovation community framework borrowed heavily from 
organizational ecology theory. An in-depth study of strategies from that perspective could 
complement the findings presented here, especially as a way to include the external factors of a 
larger regulatory environment. Although the five states studied are comparable in many ways, 
including geographical size, population, and percentage of urban and rural residents, there are 
still institutional differences between them that were not captured during the case study, but may 
influence how incentives for wind energy growth are created and received. A closer look at the 
relationships of the superstructure organizations with one another and the larger diffusion 
community is necessary.  By doing so, the research community is able to not only shape future 
policy to increase renewable energy development, but can more broadly provide a deeper 
understanding of the impact of organizations on diffusion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In an attempt to tackle the broader issue of how superstructure organizations can 
effectively impact diffusion, we introduce the literature-derived strategic structure matrix as a 
novel new framework to analyze the relationship between strategies and future diffusion. 
Developed from a theoretical background rooted in research on the role of organizations in the 
diffusion process, the strategic structure matrix improves classification and comparison of the 
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strategic focus of initiatives used by superstructure organizations. We validate the use of the 
matrix by performing a case study on wind power in five states in India. The analysis suggests 
the importance of a comprehensive strategic profile, regional regulatory measures, and supply-
side measures. The findings from this paper can shape future policy formation in order to 
increase diffusion of renewable energy. 
Additionally, the strategic structure matrix adds to existing literature on how 
superstructure organizations impact diffusion within an innovation community. By bringing 
together disparate studies on the topic and providing a framework with which to analyze 
strategies in a more comprehensive way, we hope to shape the direction of research on the 
diffusion of renewable energy technologies while at the same time impacting more general 








RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT IN EMERGING 
MARKETS: THE USE OF AGENT-BASED SIMULATION 





Over the next two decades, 80 percent of increased electricity demand will come from 
emerging markets. Renewable energy has the opportunity to play a prominent role in meeting 
this demand. In the past, industrialized countries have invested in or financed numerous 
renewable energy projects in developing countries, primarily through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. However, critics have pointed to its bureaucratic 
structure, problems with additionality and distorted credit prices as ill-equipped to streamline 
renewable energy investment. Although suggestions to alleviate these shortcomings have been 
offered by academics and industry professionals, we lack a quantitative evaluation of policy 
improvements. In this paper, we use an agent-based model to simulate the impact of policy on 
investment decisions. Specifically, we modeled individual firm behavior in evaluating whether 
or not to invest in wind energy infrastructure in India, Brazil and China, with the total amount of 
investment derived by aggregating firm decisions over time. Data from 2578 past projects as 
well as literature on investor behavior is used to inform the model structure and parameters. 
Simulations are performed under various policy scenarios for each country. Our results show that 
                                                          
10 This paper was co-authored with Professor John E. Taylor. 
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the CDM acts differently in each country and support research encouraging country- specific 
policies. They also reveal that while streamlining the approval process and reconsidering 
additionality can lead to non-trivial increase in total investment, stabilizing policy and decreasing 
investment risk will do the most to spur investment. These findings will aid policy makers in 
future policy designs to encourage renewable energy development in emerging markets. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the next two decades, developing countries will account for 80 percent of increased 
electricity demand worldwide. Renewable energy is expected to play a large role in meeting this 
demand. However, development of renewable energy infrastructure has been hindered by lack of 
financing and difficulty attracting capital (Gupta, 2012; Liming, 2009; Masini and Menichetti, 
2012). The high risk perception leads to a higher cost of capital (Donovan and Nunez, 2012; 
Sadorsky, 2012), and in developing countries, other social priorities act as competition for scarce 
funds (Gupta, 2012). Many countries also experience a “carbon lock-in” of incumbent energy 
sources, with existing infrastructure unable to adapt beyond fossil-fuel based resources (Unruh 
and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006). 
In the past, industrialized countries have provided much of the investment and financing 
to develop renewable energy in emerging markets. This was due in part to the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), a flexibility mechanism defined in the Kyoto Protocol aimed 
to reduce overall global greenhouse gas emissions by providing financial incentives for using 
zero or low-emitting technologies. Although many projects have been realized through the CDM, 
academics and industry professionals alike have deemed it inefficient and bureaucratic. Since the 
renewable energy industry is highly influenced by regulatory drivers as compared to other 
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industries (Burer and Wustenhagen, 2009; Gupta, 2012; Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006), it 
is especially important that policies encouraging renewable energy development are well-
designed and effective. Given that future financing for renewable energy in developing countries 
will likely come from developed countries (Donovan and Nunez, 2012), the research community 
needs to evaluate the CDM as a tool to encourage such investment. 
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of potential improvements to the CDM on 
investment using agent-based simulation techniques. We focus our analysis on the level of wind 
energy investment in India, Brazil and China under three different policy improvements. The 
next section provides details of the CDM including its most common criticisms and suggested 
improvements, as well as policy backgrounds for the three countries studied. This is followed by 
an introduction to agent-based simulation and details of our model. We then share our results and 
analysis before concluding with policy recommendations and a discussion of opportunities for 
future research. 
 
KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
Program description 
The Kyoto Protocol is a binding pledge adopted by several industrialized (“Annex I”) 
countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, in part by using zero- or low-emitting 
technologies for electricity production. Emission reduction is awarded with certificates that can 
be traded between countries, a system intended to reduce emissions in the most cost effective 
manner. The CDM is a flexibility mechanism defined in the Kyoto Protocol that allows projects 
in developing countries with no binding commitments to qualify for emission avoidance 
certificates, also known as Certified Emission Reduction (CER) certificates. The certificates are 
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issued based on a baseline emission scenario and the avoided emission attributed to development 
of renewable energy projects. CERs can be used by Annex I countries to meet part of their 
binding commitments. 
In theory, the CDM should encourage bi-lateral development of renewable energy 
projects in developing countries, in which an industrialized country’s investment in a project is 
repaid in part by CERs. Recently, unilateral projects developed solely by the non-Annex I host 
country have also emerged, with the CERs sold via various exchanges to a country looking to 
meet its own binding target. As of 1 April 2013, 6660 projects have been registered worldwide 
with 2337 projects under review. The CDM is one of the primary ways in which developed 
countries subsidize renewable energy infrastructure in developing countries (Donovan and 
Nunez, 2012; Hultman et al., 2012; Lewis, 2010). 
 
Key criticisms of the Clean Development Mechanism 
Despite its apparent success, the CDM has been widely criticized, leading some 
researchers to suggest that it be abandoned in favor of fiscal regulation specific to individual 
countries alongside binding emission reduction goals (Lewis, 2010; Zavodov, 2012). Other 
academics believe correcting some key flaws will greatly enhance the CDM’s effectiveness. 
Three main issues examined here are its bureaucratic process, the effectiveness of 
“additionality,” and distorted credit prices due to uncertainty around credit supply. 
 
Bureaucratic process 
Each renewable energy project must apply for CDM status in order to receive CER 
credits through a lengthy, “unwieldy and opaque bureaucratic structure” (Hultman et al., 2012, 
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pg. 91). The Samana wind farm in Gujarat, India, for example, was commissioned in 2009 and 
did not receive CDM status until February 2013. Project developers rank the risk of non-
approval as a primary concern when developing renewable energy in emerging markets 
(Hultman et al., 2012). The high transaction costs of participating in the program, therefore, 
reduce its benefits. Lewis (2010) and Dechezlepretre et al. (2008) suggest that streamlining the 
approval process as well as approving a program with multiple projects would greatly strengthen 
the design of the CDM. 
 
Additionality 
For a project to receive CDM approval, it must meet the “additionality” criteria, which 
requires developers to show that the project could not have been built without the additional 
revenue stream from sale of CER credits. However, these calculations of financial feasibility are 
based on self-reported rates of return of developers (Donovan and Nunez, 2012; Unruh and 
Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006) and there is no standard or uniform way through which this is done. 
Evidence from China (Lewis, 2010), Brazil and India (Hultman et al., 2012) imply some projects 
receiving CDM approval were not “additional.” 
 
Distorted credit prices 
Lastly, critics have cited distorted CER credit prices as a major drawback of the CDM. 
Aside from the market reactions to the recent global recession and European debt crisis, the 
particularities of the CDM have led to irrational market fluctuation of credit prices. Because of 
the lengthy and oftentimes opaque approval process, there is uncertainty around the number of 
credits that will be available on the market in the future, clouding price-change signals (Zavodov, 
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2012). Additionally, because the number of credits issued for a project is relative to a theoretical 
business-as-usual baseline, credits earned for identical projects in different locations will vary 
(Hultman et al., 2012), adding to the uncertainty around credit supply. The future of the CDM is 
also undetermined, since countries have yet to renew their reduction commitments. This 
increases risks for developers, raising the required rate of return to participate in renewable 
energy projects for some investors and possibly deterring others. Stabilization of policy with 
greater certainty in future credit supply could increase investor confidence and lead to additional 
investments. 
 
Need for quantitative analyses of Clean Development Mechanism improvements 
In short, the CDM in its current state is ill-equipped to streamline renewable energy 
investment in emerging markets (Zavodov, 2012). Although suggestions have been made to 
improve the CDM, no research has quantitatively evaluated the effect of these changes on total 
investment in renewable energy infrastructure. Informing policy makers of which changes can 
bring about the greatest increase in investment is valuable in designing future policy and 
continuing to encourage renewable energy investment in emerging markets. As a step in this 
direction, we use agent-based simulation to measure the total investment in wind energy 
infrastructure in India, Brazil and China under improvements to the CDM. 
 
Key participants of the Clean Development Mechanism 
India, Brazil and China are among the top countries in terms of CDM participation. 
According to the UNEP Risø Centre, China and India are the most active countries in Asia 
making up 55.0 percent and 29.7 percent, respectively, of all Asian CDM projects. Brazil leads 
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with 35 percent of all Latin American CDM projects. Specifically for wind power, China, India 
and Brazil have the most installed capacity of wind energy infrastructure out of all countries 
eligible to participate in the CDM as of 2012 (GWEC, 2012b). Additionally, all three countries 
are in the top ten countries with the most installed capacity during 2012 (GWEC, 2012b). 
However, each country’s potential wind resource is still much greater than the existing 
infrastructure, as shown in Table 10, and will continue to increase as turbine technology 
advances.                                                                                         
 
Table 10. Wind power potential and installed capacity in India, Brazil and China. 
 
 Potential Installed Capacity in 20121 
(% of potential) 
India 102 GW1 18.4 GW (18.0%) 
Brazil 350 GW1 2.5 GW (0.71%) 
China 2380 GW2,3 75.3 GW (3.16%) 
1 GWEC, 2012b. 
2 Phadke, 2011. 
3 Jiang et al., 2011. 
 
The above facts show that India, Brazil and China are important players in the CDM 
program with a rich dataset of projects to study, and continue to be leaders in the growing global 




In 1983, the Wind Energy Program was started by the Ministry of Non-conventional 
Energy Sources (MNES) (currently the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE)) and 
had broad goals of assessing wind resources, building demonstration projects and creating 
industry-utility partnerships (Bhattacharya and Jana, 2009; Pillai and Banerjee, 2009; Rajsekhar 
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et al., 1999). Although an initial leader in the wind energy industry compared to other developing 
countries, India’s lack of an integrated energy framework and a national mission dedicated to 
wind has stunted its growth and allowed countries such as China to soar past its progress 
(GWEC, 2012b). Despite this, several incentives have helped wind energy grow considerably 
over the past two decades, and India currently ranks fifth in installed capacity worldwide. At the 
national level, a bundle of tax incentives, including accelerated depreciation, low tariffs on 
imported wind energy technology and reduced or exempt tax for income from power sales 
helped developers largely using balance sheet financing (as opposed to project financing). 
Additionally, the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA) was established in 
1987 to provide financing to developers. It instilled confidence in the economic viability of wind 
power and paved the way for private banks to lend to developers. Several state governments have 
enacted preferential feed-in tariffs, which encourage wind power development by providing a 
higher rate to electricity produced from wind. Recently, some states have also implemented 
renewable purchase obligations (RPO) which require a certain amount of power produced to 
come from renewable sources, although lack of enforcement have negated much of its intended 
effect. Looking forward, some challenges facing the wind industry in India include implementing 
an integrated framework and a national feed-in tariff program, as well as continued development 
of transmission and other support infrastructure.  
 
Brazil 
Brazil has long been a leader in renewable energy due to its numerous hydroelectric 
power plants. In an effort to diversify its energy portfolio and to hedge against low power 
production during the dry season and droughts, Brazil has aggressively promoted wind as part of 
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its primary energy mix. Although a recent entrant into the wind power industry, the country is 
characterized by strong winds that allow turbines to operate for a longer period of time than in 
most other countries, giving the technology operational and financial advantages. In 2002, the 
government created the Program for Incentive of Alternative Electric Energy Sources (Proinfa), 
which consolidated several previous actions promoting alternative energy development and 
provides subsidies and financial incentives funded through an electricity surcharge on power 
consumers (Dutra and Szklo, 2008). The National Development Bank also provides financing for 
machinery and equipment through its subsidiary Finame. It has created a strong domestic 
industry and eleven international equipment manufacturers have opened production facilities in 
the country (GWEC, 2012b). Starting in 2009, the government has held several wind-only 
energy auctions, essentially guaranteeing that wind energy operators received over half of the 
contracts to sell power in 2011 and 2012 (Leahy, 2013). However, the prices at which developers 
have agreed to sell electricity are extremely low and have caused concerns over the sustainability 
of future wind power growth (Leahy, 2013). In order to continue growth of its wind industry in 
the upcoming years, Brazil must ensure sufficient transmission infrastructure to keep up with the 
increase in electricity production and reduce financial risks through improved government 
regulations (GWEC, 2012b; Martins and Pereira, 2011). 
 
China 
Over the past decade, China has experienced rapid growth and currently has the highest 
installed capacity of wind energy infrastructure globally. In 2005, the government created the 
Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China. After its adoption, a series of policies 
have been enacted to promote renewable energy development, including a dedicated renewable 
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energy development fund supported by an electricity surcharge on consumers (Jiang et al., 2011). 
Additionally, feed-in tariffs have been used to give wind power a financial advantage. The 
manufacturing industry has also flourished due to policy incentives, creating a full supply chain 
with 88 percent of the domestic market occupied by Chinese manufacturers (Jiang et al., 2011). 
Since most developers are stated-owned enterprises supported by government-backed 
commercial banks eager to invest in infrastructure, the wind industry in China experiences lower 
financial risks and was largely unaffected by the 2009 crisis that upset the US and European 
industries (GWEC, 2012b). Several obstacles still remain, however, most notably the inadequate 
transmission system and lack of regulations for wind power integration into the grid (GWEC, 
2012b; Jiang et al., 2011). 
 
Opportunities created by India, Brazil and China analyses 
By analyzing these three countries, not only can we gain insight into which 
improvements to the CDM are the best at encouraging development, but under what 
circumstances. By doing so quantitatively, we aim to measure the effect improvements to the 
CDM policy will have on investment decisions. Our results will better inform policy makers as 
to where they should concentrate their efforts to create the greatest increase in total renewable 
energy investment in emerging markets. 
 
AGENT-BASED SIMULATION 
In order to determine the impact of changes to the CDM, we built an agent-based model 
to simulate the total investment in renewable energy given certain policy environments. Agent-
based simulation was selected because of its extensive use in past studies to model and evaluate 
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investment decisions under various policy scenarios. Mueller and de Haan et al. (2009), de Haan 
et al. (2009) and Eppstein et al. (2011) used agent-based simulation to determine how much 
incentives affect car purchase decisions and market penetration of plug-in hybrid electric 
vehicles. Jackson (2010) analyzed energy efficiency of a smart grid program and Veit et al. 
(2009) determined the implications of transmission constraints on the German electricity market, 
both using agent based simulation. 
Our agent-based model simulated investment decisions of an individual or firm seeking 
to develop a wind energy project. The decision is based on several factors that influence a 
project’s potential revenue and profitability, including project properties, local conditions, and an 
investor’s own characteristics. The model aggregated all investment decisions of investors over 
time to determine the total investment. Simulations were performed for investors in India, Brazil 
and China, allowing us to quantify the incremental investment on wind energy infrastructure 
under the presence of the CDM in each country. Sensitivity analysis was done to measure the 
impact of three improvements to the CDM program: streamlining the approval process, 
reconsidering the requirement of additionality, and reducing investor risk by stabilizing policy. 
The results allowed us to compare the effectiveness of the CDM and various program changes 
within and across countries. 
 
Model structure and baseline calibration 
The agent-based model was designed and coded in AnyLogic, a powerful and robust 
simulation environment. The simulation environment is populated with agents representing 
individuals or firms, which we call “investors.” An investor decides whether or not to build a 
wind energy project by evaluating its profitability. The decision process is represented in Figure 
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17. By default, the simulation initially treats all investors as “inexperienced.” Each year, an 
investor considers developing a project with the properties and situational characteristics 
presented in Table 11 and detailed later in this section. The investor calculates the project’s net 
present value (NPV) using its required rate of return. If the NPV is positive, then the project is 
built and the investor becomes “experienced.” The rates of return used for experienced and 
inexperienced investors are based on a study done by Donovan and Nunez (2012) on the cost of 
capital for renewable energy projects in emerging markets, and are also listed in Table 11. If an 
experienced investor does not build any projects for five years, then it reverts back to 
inexperienced. We ran the simulation for a period of T years and aggregated the costs of built 




Figure 17. Decision process of an investor. 
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Table 11. Parameters used in baseline agent-based simulation. 
  









t Number of investors 50 50 50 
Delay in receiving credits* 3 years 2 years 2 years 
Probability of getting 
CDM approval* 









19.06% 13.68% 11.08% 
Inexperienced investor 
discount rate** 
14.80% 12.09% 8.32% 
Time of inactivity to revert 
back to inexperienced 






Years credits are received*  10 years 7 years 7 years 
Years electricity is 
produced 




mean = 17.02 MW 
Exponential 
distribution with 
mean = 75.13 MW 
Either 50 MW or 
200 MW 
Capacity factor* 23.3% 42.7% 24.5% 
Average CER credit 
received per MW 
capacity* 
N(1891, 298) N(1259, 409) N(2032, 304) 








Yearly O&M cost per 
MWh electricity 
produced*** 
10 USD 10 USD 10 USD 
 
* Derived from CDM project database 
** Donovan and Nunez, 2012. 
*** International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012. 
 
The cost and revenue streams for a project are based on four components: a) initial cost, 
b) yearly revenue from electricity sales, c) yearly operations and maintenance cost, and d) yearly 
revenue from Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credit sales. The NPV for each project is 
calculated using the following equation, 




with PV representing the present value calculation of revenue or cost streams. 
While the structure of the model remained the same for all three countries analyzed, 
model parameters necessary to calculate costs and revenue were derived for each country using a 
database of all projects that have applied for CDM registration as of 1 April 2013, publicly 
available from the UNEP Risø Centre. After streamlining the data to focus on wind energy and 
removing duplicate projects that were listed more than once because of resubmissions, 83 
projects were used to calibrate parameters for Brazil’s model, 1544 for China’s, and 931 for 
India’s.  
The initial cost of a project was calculated by multiplying the project size in megawatts 
(MW) of installed capacity by the average cost per MW. For each country, project size was 
randomly simulated based on an empirically-determined distribution of past projects. In the 
models for both India and Brazil, an exponential distribution with positive skewness (long right 
tail) was observed for project size with a mean of 17.02 MW and 75.13 MW, respectively. In 
China, the majority of CDM wind energy projects were between 40 and 50 MW, with an 
astonishing 999 (64.7%) projects with the exact size of 49.5 MW. This is because projects larger 
than 50 MW require approval from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
while smaller projects are approved by local provincial governments and recorded with central 
government authorities (Jiang et al., 2011), suggesting that developers prefer working with local 
authorities. Therefore in China’s model, a project’s size was simulated as either 50 MW with a 
probability of 0.9 or 200 MW with probability 0.1 in order to include the larger scale projects. 
The average unit cost per MW was also determined from information in the database. Project 
cost in all three countries followed a normal distribution, with no significant correlation found 
between project size and unit cost. 
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Yearly revenue from electricity sales was forecasted by multiplying the yearly electricity 
production by the expected price of electricity. It was received for the lifecycle of the project, 
which is 20 years. Yearly electricity production was calculated using capacity factors derived 
from the CDM project database for each country. The expected price of electricity was 
determined using feed-in tariff data for wind power in India (GWEC, 2012a) and China (Jiang et 
al., 2011). To maintain flexibility in the model, the feed-in tariffs for each Indian state were 
averaged and applied uniformly to all projects in India. Similarly for China, feed-in tariffs for 
individual zones were also averaged. A breakdown of the feed-in tariffs for each state and the 
average tariff utilized in our model is provided in Table 12 and Table 13. Brazil does not 
currently utilize feed-in tariffs for wind energy. Instead, the average price of the 2011 wind 
power auction of 99.58 BRL per MWh as reported by Bloomberg News and Merco Press was 
used to inform the model. 
 
Table 12. Feed-in tariffs for electricity produced from wind power in China. 
 
 Feed-in tariff per kWh [CNY] 
Category 1 0.51 
Category 2 0.54 
Category 3 0.58 
Category 4 0.61 
Average 0.56* 
 
Source: Jiang et al., 2011. 








Table 13. Feed-in tariffs for electricity produced from wind power in India. 
 
 Feed-in tariff per kWh [INR] 
Andhra Pradesh 4.70 
Gujarat 4.23 
Haryana Wind Zone 1 - 6.14 
Wind Zone 2 - 4.91 
Wind Zone 3 - 4.09 
Wind Zone 4 - 3.84 
Karnataka 3.70 
Kerala 3.64 
Madhya Pradesh 4.35 
Maharashtra Wind Zone 1 - 5.67 
Wind Zone 2 - 4.93 
Wind Zone 3 - 4.20 
Wind Zone 4 - 3.78 
Orissa 5.31 
Punjab 5.07 
Rajasthan 4.46 and 4.69 
Tamil Nadu 3.51 
Uttarakhand Wind Zone 1 - 5.15 
Wind Zone 2 - 4.35 
Wind Zone 3 - 3.65 
Wind Zone 4 - 3.20 
West Bengal 4.87 
Average 4.448* 
 
Source: Global Wind Energy Council, 2012a. 
*Converted to USD using average monthly exchange rate for 2011 of 1 USD = 44.899 INR. 
 
 
While data for yearly operations and maintenance costs is not widely available, a survey 
of over 60 projects built in the 2000s revealed an average operations and maintenance cost of 10 
USD per MWh of electricity produced (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012), making 
the total annual operations and maintenance dependent on project size. The unit cost was used 
for the models of all three countries and incurred for the lifecycle of the project. 
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Similar to revenue received from electricity sales, the revenue received from sale of CER 
credits was forecasted by multiplying the total number of credits by its expected price each year 
for which credits are received. Since the number of credits is calculated based on comparison 
with a theoretical business-as-usual baseline and may differ for projects of the same size, it was 
randomly generated in our models based on an empirically-determined distribution of values 
from the CDM project database for each country. The expected CER credit prices were 
simulated in MATLAB using techniques from Tang et al. (2012). We assume that daily returns 
follow Geometric Brownian motion, with the parameters calibrated from historical price data 
from 1 September 2009 to 31 August 2010. The CDM allows a single 10-year crediting period or 
7-year crediting period which can be renewed. For model simplicity and due to uncertainty 
surrounding credit renewal, a single value is used for each country’s model. In India, the large 
majority of past projects applied for a 10-year crediting period while projects in both Brazil and 
China opted for a 7-year crediting period. 
Two additional factors were taken into account: 1) probability of project acceptance and 
2) delay in receiving credits. The database indicated that, on average, 80.47 percent, 77.5 percent 
and 97.91 percent of wind energy projects in India, Brazil and China, respectively, were accepted 
while the others did not receive CDM status. In our simulation, only projects that are approved 
were built. The database also indicated that there was an average delay of three years until 
credits are received in India and an average delay of two years in Brazil and China. In the 
models, this translated into a delay in receiving credit sale revenue which decreases the present 
value of credit sale revenue. Each investor evaluated each project independently. The initial costs 
of all built projects were aggregated to produce the total investment in wind energy infrastructure 
over the simulation time period. 
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Policy improvements and sensitivity analysis 
The first improvement tested is streamlining the approval process for CDM registration 
and subsequent distribution of CER credits. To capture its effects, the value for delay in 
receiving CER credits was manipulated. A more efficient process equates to less waiting time to 
receive credits. Values of zero to five years were used to simulate total investment, holding all 
other parameters constant. 
The second improvement tested is relaxing or eliminating the condition of additionality. 
In the models, this was equivalent to changing the probability that a project is accepted, with a 
probability of 1 meaning that “additionality” is excluded from the CDM. Values ranging from 
0.6 to 1 in increments of 0.05 were tested holding all other parameters constant. Analysis was not 
performed for China since 97.91 percent of projects were already approved. 
The last improvement tested is to reduce the magnitude of credit price 
 distortion by stabilizing policy and providing greater clarity on future credit supply. 
Policy risk is captured in the discount rate of the investors; the more stable the policy, the lower 
the discount rate. Since there are different discount rates for experienced and inexperienced 
investors, this is done in terms of change to the discount rate. For example, “+2.5%” indicates an 
increase of 2.5 percent to both discount rates. Values of -5.0 percent to +5.0 percent in 
increments of 0.5 percent were tested holding all other parameters constant. 
 
RESULTS 
Baseline simulations were performed for T equal to 10 years, 15 years, and 20 years for 
each country. Thirty simulations were executed for each time period and the results for each 
simulation were averaged to obtain an average total investment for each value of T. Since the 
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three countries differ greatly in population and electricity demand, the raw values of total 
investment are not appropriate for comparisons across countries. Instead, we simulated one more 
scenario in which we measure total investment in the absence of the CDM by removing the 
revenue stream from CER credit sales when calculating a project’s NPV.  Table 14 shows the 
results for India, Brazil and China and allows us to compare the impact of the CDM in each 
country. Sensitivity analyses were performed with T equal to 10 years. The results are detailed 
for each country in the following subsections. Again, 30 simulations were executed for each 
change of the appropriate parameter and then averaged. 
 
Table 14. Average total investment of the “No CDM” and “CDM baseline” scenarios. 
 
 Total investment with no CDM 
[billions USD] 
Total investment with baseline CDM 
(as % of no CDM) 
T 10 15 20 10 15 20 
























The results from Table 14 show total investment of wind energy projects in India 
increased under the presence of the CDM, indicating that previously unprofitable projects 
became profitable with additional revenue from CER credit sales and were developed. Figure 18 
further demonstrates this point by providing histograms of the NPVs of all wind energy projects 
considered over 10 years in two sample simulations, one including the CDM and one excluding 
it. More projects had positive NPVs during the simulation with CDM. However, the majority of 
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projects still had NPVs of less than zero, which indicates that they were rejected by the investor 
and not built, even with the extra revenue stream. 
 
 
Figure 18. Histogram of NPV of all Indian projects considered in a sample simulation. 
 
Figure 19 shows the impact on total investment when the delay in receiving CER credits 
was changed as compared to the baseline CDM scenario. The solid black square indicates total 
investment under the baseline scenario with a wait time of three years. As expected, total 
investment increased when the delay is shortened, with a linear trend. Under the best case 
scenario with no delay, total investment grew by over 30 percent. 
To test the effect of relaxing or removing the requirement of additionality, we changed 
the probability of projects being approved and receiving CER credits. If the condition of 
additionality is completely removed, this is equivalent to the probability equaling 1. Figure 20 
shows total investment compared to the baseline scenario. The solid black square represents total 























investment increased when the chances of receiving CER credits were increased. Under the best 
case scenario with guaranteed credits, total investment grew by approximately 35 percent. 
Lastly, we used investor discount rate as a proxy for the policy stability, with a decrease 
in the discount rate representing an increase in stability. Figure 21 shows the total investment 
compared to the baseline when changing discount rate for both experienced and inexperienced 
investors. The solid black square represents total investment under the baseline scenario with no 
changes to either discount rate. Unlike the previous two policy improvements, there appears to 
be a nearly quadratic relationship between total investment and changes to the discount rate. 
Additionally, the impact on total investment was greater, reaching 343 percent of baseline total 
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For wind energy projects in Brazil, Table 14 shows less investment when the CDM 
existed as compared to investment without the program. Although counterintuitive, this can 
happen when profitable projects that are built under the no CDM scenario are not built under the 
CDM scenario because they did not receive CDM approval. Discussion of this phenomenon can 
be found in the following section. Figure 22 displays histograms of the NPVs of all wind energy 
projects considered over 10 years in two sample simulations, one which included the CDM and 
one which excluded it. Unlike the histogram of project NPVs in India, the aggregate of projects 
with negative NPVs was approximately the same under both scenarios. In both cases, the 
majority of projects still had NPVs of less than zero and was not built. 
 
 
Figure 22. Histogram of NPV of all Brazilian projects considered in a sample simulation. 
 
 
Figures 23, 24 and 25 show the results of scenario analysis for Brazil of streamlining the 
































































































policy stability, respectively. The solid black squares in each figure represent total investment 
under the baseline CDM scenario and the top and bottom bars indicate two standard deviations 
of investment over 30 simulations. Streamlining the approval process and allowing investors to 
receive CER credits earlier had an almost negligible effect on total investment. Increasing the 
number of projects receiving CDM status does lead to additional investment, with an increase of 
35 percent of all projects are approved. Similar to the results of the India analysis, stabilizing 
policy and decreasing investor discount rates drastically increased total investment. 
 
 

































Figure 24. Sensitivity analysis for the probability of CDM program approval in Brazil. 
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The presence of the CDM in China increased total investment in wind energy 
infrastructure according to the results of Table 14. However, most projects are profitable even 
without the extra revenue of CER credit sales, as shown in Figure 26. Therefore we can expect 
that any improvements to the CDM will not drastically increase investment, reflected in Figures 
27 and 28. (Because over 97 percent of projects are already receiving CDM project approval, 
sensitivity analysis was not performed on this parameter). Same as with the results of the 
previous two countries, the solid black squares represent baseline CDM investment with the top 
and bottom bars indicating two standard deviations of investment over 30 simulations. 
 
 





















Figure 27. Sensitivity analysis for the delay of issuance of CER credits in China. 
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Although originally intended as a reference point for scenario analysis of the three policy 
improvements, the CDM baseline results provide some interesting insights for individual 
countries and comparison across them. We discuss below two key findings: 1) why most projects 
considered in China have positive NPVs while the reverse is true for India and Brazil; and 2) 
why Brazil’s level of investment actually decreases under the presence of the CDM. We then 
discuss the results of the policy improvements to the CDM and its implications for the future of 
the program as well as other energy policy measures. 
 
Baseline comparison between countries 
In the sample simulations of all wind energy projects considered, Figures 18, 22 and 26 
show that the NPVs of most projects in India and Brazil are negative and rejected, while most 
projects in China are profitable and built. Since this is the case for the scenario when the CDM 
does not exist, we can attribute China’s superior performance to the landscape in which projects 
are developed. A study done by Tang et al. (2013, in press) showed the importance of a 
comprehensive strategic approach to initiatives used to promote diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies. We use the strategic structure matrix developed by Tang et al. (2013, in press) as a 
framework to analyze each country’s existing policies. 
The matrix breaks down each policy into five different categories in terms of which area 
it targets. Table 15 summarizes the five categories, and details on development and usage of the 
matrix can be found in Tang et al. (in press). Table 16 classifies the policies and incentives of 
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Table 16. Classification of country specific policies and incentives. 
 














Market Direct Demand 
Feed-in tariffs Financial 
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Market Direct Demand 
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Market Direct Supply 
Feed-in tariffs Financial 
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Market Indirect Supply 
Wind auctions Financial 
Systems and 
infrastructure 
Market Direct Demand 
 
China’s policies toward wind power development are more comprehensive in terms of 
the number of strategies covered. Most notably, its renewable energy law and government 
involvement in the commercial banking sector is able to overcome regulatory hurdles to 
diffusion, strengthen ties between facilitating organizations, improve the institutional landscape 
for wind power deployment, and advance organizations interested in developing more renewable 
energy infrastructure. These strategic areas are missing from the bundle of policies and 
incentives offered by India and Brazil, and support previous findings that a comprehensive 
approach to increasing diffusion is most effective (Tang et al., in press). By doing so, China 
offered investors stability and reduced risk. It was thought of as a “safe haven” for wind power 
investment when the effects of the global financial crisis reached the wind industry in other parts 
of the world (GWEC, 2012b), explaining the low required rates of return found by Donovan and 
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Nunez (2012) and used as the discount rates in our simulation. The importance of the discount 
rate to total investment is clear when looking at Figures 21, 25 and 28, which will be discussed in 
more detail in the following subsection. 
Brazil and India’s focus on market-forming financial incentives are usually found in the 
early phases of technology diffusion. While this is understandable for Brazil since it recently 
entered the market, India has been a part of the wind power industry for over 20 years. India’s 
lack of a comprehensive national policy for wind power combined with the segmented nature of 
the energy sector emphasizing states is hurting its growth. Researchers agree that a unified vision 
with national goals is essential for India’s continued growth (GWEC, 2012b). As part of a study 
done by Martins and Pereira (2012), questionnaires were sent to companies, academic and 
research institutions, and national organizations and associations asking them to rank initiatives 
to expand renewable energy deployment in Brazil. Two of the highest ranked issues were a) 
improve government regulations and b) reduce financial risks. For both countries, the sustained 
regulatory uncertainty means investors will continue to require higher rates of return. 
Table 14 shows that total investment in wind energy infrastructure in Brazil actually 
decreased under the presence of the CDM. This seemingly counterintuitive finding is due to the 
country’s ratio of revenue from electricity sales to CER credit sales. Brazil’s wind resources 
allow increased power production, leading to an average capacity factor of 42.7 percent 
compared to 23.3 percent for India and 24.5 percent for China (see Table 11). This may be a 
contributing factor to the low bid prices from investors in recent auctions. However, average 
capital cost is much higher, leading to the highest frequency of non-profitable projects in our 
simulation. Unfortunately for Brazil, since CER credits issued through the CDM are based on 
comparison against a baseline scenario, Brazil’s success with hydropower actually hurts its wind 
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industry with respect to participation in the program. The average number of credits it receives 
for the same size of a wind farm is much less than that received by India or China since Brazil’s 
energy mix is already heavily reliant on emission-free sources. Combined with the higher 
volume of electricity produced, it means that revenue received from electricity sales matters 
more than revenue from CER credit sales when calculating NPV. This explains the decrease in 
investment under the presence of the CDM. The extra credit revenue does little to push 
unprofitable projects into profitability, while rejection of approximately 33% of projects from the 
CDM means that they will not be built, even if they are profitable. 
China’s tight regulatory control over the wind power industry is rare and should not be 
considered normal for renewable energy development in emerging markets. While the feed-in 
tariff and CER credit sales generate extra revenue for the investors, some projects are still 
unprofitable, as presented in our simulation results from India and Brazil. This highlights the 
need for continued financial support of wind energy infrastructure in emerging economies. 
Although some projects may be financially feasible without additional government support, to 
achieve the level of investment necessary to meet future demand, incentives must continue to 
exist. The different reactions to the CDM from the three countries in our analysis, however, 
support the view that CDM should play a secondary role and development countries should 
adopt their own commitments to reduce emissions (Lewis, 2010; Zavodov, 2012). 
 
Policy improvements 
Several improvements to the CDM may encourage greater investment in renewable 
energy infrastructure in emerging markets. Since most of China’s wind power projects were 
already being developed under the CDM baseline simulation, improvements to the program 
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cannot meaningfully increase investment. It should be noted that these improvements may 
increase the profit margin for individual projects and investors in China. However, the only way 
to increase total investment is to increase revenue for a proposed project with negative NPV so 
that it is profitable and subsequently built. Therefore we focus our analysis here on Brazil and 
India. 
Our simulation results shows that streamlining the approval process and shortening the 
length of time it takes to receive CER credits raises the total level of investment in wind power in 
India. As a regulatory improvement that strengthens ties between organizations promoting 
diffusion of wind power, it is unsurprising for India to have such a positive reaction. However, it 
had a negligible effect on total investment for Brazilian projects. This is likely due to the fact that 
the revenue from credit sales is less of a factor in calculating NPV as discussed previously. Few 
unprofitable projects that are already receiving credits will become profitable when changing the 
present value of credit revenue. Allowing more projects to receive credits, however, does lead to 
higher investment. 
Investments in both India and Brazil increased when the goals of additionality were 
reconsidered, with total investment rising by 31 percent and 35 percent, respectively. By 
allowing all renewable energy projects to receive credits regardless of their financial viability in 
its absence, previously unprofitable projects became profitable, were developed, and increased 
total investment.  This is encouraging to researchers who believe the CDM would be greatly 
improved without the additionality criteria (Donovan and Nunez, 2012; Lewis, Hultman et al., 
2012; Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006). 
 Most striking, however, is the effect of stabilizing policy and lowering investment risk 
for developers. A 1 percent decrease in discount rates leads to, on average, 50 percent more 
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simulated projects becoming profitable in India and 56 percent more projects in Brazil, with a 
doubling of investment realized at a 2 percent decrease in India and a 2.5 percent decrease in 
Brazil. This has clear implications for policy makers. No matter how attractive they make the 
financial incentives, having them be stable (for example, longer periods until renewal) will do 
much more to increase investment. The baseline comparisons between the three countries also 
echo this fact, as the simulation results for China, the country with the lowest discount rates, 
show many more projects being realized and higher levels of investment. Additionally, the 
sensitivity analysis on the Chinese discount rates show investment cut in half when the discount 
rates increase by 3 percent, which is still lower than the discount rates used for the Brazil 
simulation. The importance of policy stability and lower risk has been observed historically as 
well as by many researchers. For example, the appearance and disappearance of tax credits in the 
US led to a bust-boom development cycle for wind power in the 1990s (Bird et al., 2005; 
Bolinger et al., 2009; Harper et al., 2007). 
 
CONCLUSION 
In an attempt to encourage renewable energy investment, the CDM has provided an 
incentive for parties from industrialized countries to develop renewable infrastructure in 
emerging markets. As the future of the CDM is currently being debated, there have been many 
suggestions to improve the program and address some of its shortcomings, including 
streamlining its bureaucratic process, relaxing or removing the requirement of additionality, and 
lowering investor risk by stabilizing policy. We utilized agent-based simulation to quantify total 
investment in three countries: India, Brazil and China, which are key participants in both the 
CDM and the global wind power industry. While we intended primarily to evaluate the effects of 
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various regulatory improvements to the CDM, country comparisons of the baseline scenario 
provided valuable insights. The success of China’s wind power development can be attributed in 
part to a comprehensive approach to renewable energy policy and initiatives, especially the high 
level of regulatory oversight. However, this should not be considered widespread and the results 
from India and Brazil reveal the need for continued financial incentives for emerging markets. 
Our results from the sensitivity analysis of policy improvements show that, compared with the 
baseline, streamlining the approval process and increasing the odds of project approval has the 
potential to add significant investment to the wind power sector. However, stabilizing policy is 
even more effective in increasing the level of investment. This provides key insights to 
policymakers when designing future policy to encourage renewable development in developing 
countries. Future research can expand this analysis to other countries that also participate in the 











The chapters of this dissertation contribute to the growing body of research from 
academics who believe the status quo of energy production is unsustainable. The rise of climate 
change and environmental pollution has put increasing the share of RE in the global energy mix 
as a top concern for governments worldwide. The findings shared here aid policy makers to 
design relevant incentives to complement existing regulatory landscapes, quantitatively evaluate 
the effects of policy changes and create financial mechanisms that address the challenges facing 
RE investors. The next two sections summarize the individual contributions of the three papers 




Chapter 2 – Financing renewable energy infrastructure: formation, pricing and impact of a 
carbon revenue bond 
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the financing mechanisms that have emerged as a result of energy 
policy in the US. The proposed carbon revenue bond as a novel financing tool addresses the 
shortcomings of these financing structures, namely their heavy dependence on tax credits. It 
builds and extends on previous findings that tax incentives are unstable and ineffective (Bird et 
al, 2005; Bolinger et al., 2009; Carley, 2009; Carley, 2011) by enhancing credit markets that 
form around certain regulatory measures and better aligns the timing of the when funds are 
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needed and when incentives are realized. Additionally, it extends application of quantitative 
methods to model future credit prices as a way to price the bond (Bollerslev, 1986; Brigo et al., 
2009, Engle and Ng, 1993; Merton, 1976; Schwartz, 1997). The three illustrative examples 
presented in Chapter 2 reveal that sale of a carbon revenue bond can meaningfully finance wind 
energy projects, with median bond values ranging from 15.1 percent to 115 percent of initial 
costs. The quantitative risk assessment which accompanies the stochastic methodology of bond 
pricing allows investors to make more informed decisions about the level of risk they are willing 
to carry. A carbon revenue bond enhances certain regulatory measures and the markets that 
develop around them. While policies such as the Kyoto Protocol and RPS do not directly address 
the high initial cost of RE infrastructure, the use of the bond alongside these measures provides 
developers with pre-development funds. Developers are able to decrease their dependence on tax 
investors, a subset of investors that have shrunk after the financial downturn (Schwabe et al., 
2009). Inclusion of the carbon revenue bond as a primary tool of RE development effectively 
offsets the higher initial costs associated with RE infrastructure. 
 
Chapter 3 – Strategic structure matrix: a framework for explaining the impact of 
superstructure organizations on the diffusion of wind energy infrastructure 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the strategic structure matrix extended past research on the 
relationship between organizations and innovation diffusion. I concentrate analysis on the 
superstructure organizations of Lynn et al.’s (1996) innovation community framework to 
determine the role that coordinating organizations including governments have on diffusion of 
RE infrastructure. Extending beyond research examining how characteristics such as size and 
heterogeneity affect the influence of organizations (Howells, 2006; Lynn et al., 1996), I focus on 
how strategies or combination of strategies behind organizational initiatives impact its 
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effectiveness. Previous literature on the relationship between strategy and diffusion on clean-tech 
as well as innovation in general (Brown and Hendry, 2009; Fernandez de Lucio et al., 2010; 
Foxon and Pearson, 2008; Jacobson and Bergek, 2004; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Nemet, 
2009; Sargsyan et al., 2010) was synthesized to create the five-dimensional categorization of 
strategies found in the strategic structure matrix. It offers a deeper analysis of the design of 
initiatives used to encourage RE technologies. The explanatory value of the matrix was texted 
during a case study of wind power diffusion in five Indian states. The results from case study 
builds upon past analysis of the Indian RE sector (Bhattacharya and Jana, 2009; Jagadeesh, 2000; 
Phadke, 2011; Pillai and Banerjee, 2009; Rajsekhar et al., 1999; Rao and Kishore, 2009). It 
showed that the matrix was successful in explaining why there was more wind power 
development in certain states by linking the timing of initiatives to empirically derived diffusion 
curves, using methods from Bass (1969) and Mahajan and Peterson (1985). Additionally, it 
pinpointed reasons for continued diffusion of wind power in some states and not others. The 
findings imply that sustained growth in the renewable energy sector requires a comprehensive set 
of strategies cross all categories and that some initiatives depend on existing support in other 
strategic areas, consistent with previous literature (Brown and Hendry, 2009; Fernandez de Lucio 
et al., 2010; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Lynn, 1998). They also support the notation that the 
effect of incentives are strongly dependent on the existing regulatory environment (Luthi and 
Prassler, 2011). The strategic structure matrix provides a better understanding of the conditions 






Chapter 4 – Renewable energy investment in emerging markets: the use of agent-based 
simulation to evaluate improvements to the Clean Development Mechanism 
 
Chapter 4 detailed the development and use of an agent-based model to simulate 
investment decisions under different policy scenario. The motivation for this evaluation arose 
from a lack of studies to quantify the effects of improvements to the CDM. Although the CDM is 
the primary way in which industrialized countries invest in RE projects in emerging markets 
(Donovan and Nunez, 2012; Hultman et al., 2012; Lewis, 2010), several of its shortcomings 
include an opaque and bureaucratic process, questionable effectiveness of additionality, and 
distorted credit prices arising from policy uncertainties (Dechezlepretre et al., 2008; Donovan 
and Nunez, 2012; Hultman et al., 2012; Lewis, 2010; Zavodov, 2012). The agent-based 
simulation improved evaluation of changes to make the CDM a more efficient and effective 
program by providing quantitative comparison of total investment levels under each scenario. 
Additionally, it extended the application of agent-based models to evaluate energy policy (de 
Haan et al., 2009; Eppstein et al.; 2011; Muller and de Haan et al., 2009; Jackson, 2010; Viet et 
al., 2009). The model was used to simulate investment in wind energy infrastructure in India, 
Brazil and China, key participants in the CDM and the leading emerging markets for wind 
power. The pricing method described in Chapter 2 (Tang et al., 2012) was used to calculate 
future credit revenue and the results of country comparisons further validated the explanatory 
power of the strategic structure matrix presented in Chapter 3 (Tang et al., 2013, in press). The 
baseline comparisons between the three countries highlighted the difference in changes to total 
investment levels under participation in the CDM, supporting findings from previous studies that 
the effectiveness of the same policy varies based on the existing policy environment and other 
social objectives (Luthi and Prassler, 2011; Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye, 2007; Tang et al, 
2013, in press;). Previous researchers advocating for individual country responses to RE 
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development as opposed to continued reliance on the CDM are also bolstered by this finding 
(Lewis, 2010; Zavodov, 2012). The results of the sensitivity analysis revealed the importance of 
stabilizing policy and reducing investor risk, reinforcing findings of the Martins and Pereira 
(2012) survey which cited improving government regulations and reducing risk the two of the 
top suggestions from academics and industry participants alike to increase RE development.  
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Taken together, the findings from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 carry important implications for the 
future of energy policy and its associated financing mechanisms. All three chapters, and 
especially the results of the agent-based simulation in Chapter 4, note the importance of a stable 
policy which lowers investor risk and increases total levels of development. For example, the 
federal tax incentives in the US are dependent on budgets and congressional approval. The 
constant expiration and renewal have created fluctuations in levels of RE development—most 
noticeably in the Texas wind industry—and have discouraged long-term planning (Bird et al, 
2005; Bolinger et al., 2009). The analysis of wind power diffusion in Indian states revealed that 
Gujarat experienced a period of stagnating investment that coincided with the same period of 
time when there was an absence of wind energy policies (Roa and Kishore, 2009). A similar 
situation was observed in Karnataka, where the lack of strong policy signals from the state 
delayed its entrance into the wind energy industry, despite having high technical potential. The 
agent-based simulations in India, Brazil and China further stress this point by quantitatively 
providing evidence that total investment is highly sensitive to investors’ discount rates, which in 
part is determined by the regulatory risks of development. For energy policy to have consistent 
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and substantial impact in aiding RE growth, it must be stable to complement the planning efforts 
and long lifecycle of RE infrastructure. 
The findings in this dissertation also shed an unfavorable light on the long-term value of 
tax incentives. Use of generous tax benefits requires entities with large tax obligations, which is 
less advantageous for smaller developers. This explains the heavy depends on tax investors in the 
US to finance wind energy infrastructure. Unfortunately, the pool of available and interested 
investors, including investment and commercial banks, decreased after the economic downturn, 
essentially tying the ability to finance wind power to an outside corporation’s tax obligations. In 
India, accelerated depreciation gave developers the ability to depreciate 100% (later reduced to 
80%) of the cost of wind power infrastructure in the first year of operations, also leading to the 
participation of large corporations. While effective—surveys revealed that tax benefits are the 
primary reason for investment in wind power (Pillai and Banerjee, 2009; Rajsekhar et al., 
1999)—accelerated depreciation awards additional installed capacity but not necessarily more 
renewable electricity production. Additionally, tax savings act on the demand side (increases 
rewards after development) and do not help with the high initial costs. The case study in Chapter 
3 revealed state governments in India overwhelmingly favored supply side initiatives that lower 
initial barriers to RE development. Future mechanisms to encourage RE growth should act on the 
supply side, like the carbon revenue bond presented in Chapter 2. 
Lastly, Chapters 3 and 4 highlighted the importance of using different policies in 
different locations. The effect of the same policy measures on encouraging RE growth is 
dependent on the current incentive landscape of a country or state, as presented in analysis of the 
initial diffusion phase of wind energy in India. The simulation results from Chapter 4 reinforced 
this finding by quantitatively demonstrating the differences in total investment levels under the 
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same policy in three different countries. The findings from Chapter 3 also showed that regulatory 
measures are more effective on a local level, and a holistic approach to cover all strategic area is 
valuable to increasing RE diffusion. Therefore new incentives should address the strategic gaps 
of existing regulation. As the future of the CDM continues to be debated, improvements to the 
program should be made on a country-by-country basis to address weak strategic areas of 
existing policy. For example, streamlining the approval process and decreasing bureaucracy 
increased simulated investments in India but not in Brazil. While the regulations should differ, 
the markets that trade CER credits should operate on an international basis, as suggested toward 
the end of Chapter 3.  
Together, the research presented in this dissertation contributes to the growing body of 
literature on how to leverage policy to increase renewable energy development. The carbon 
revenue bond presents a way to enhance existing policy measures, while the strategic structure 
matrix and agent-based model are ways to qualitatively and quantitatively create and evaluate 
new policy initiatives. Continued research in this areas is necessary for the academic community 
to remain involved in the continued development of RE infrastructure. Doing so allows 
researchers to sustainably address the issues of rising energy demands and environmental 








SUGGESTED DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
While this dissertation addressed some critical issues of how to increase RE 
development, research is needed for continued growth as part of our evolution into a more 
sustainable society. In addition to replicating studies in different countries on different 
technologies, below are three areas in which the work presented here can be extended. 
Involvement of institutional investors – This dissertation largely focused on active 
developers of RE infrastructure assets. Additional research can investigate the ways in which 
passive investors can participate in RE development. Institutional investors, including pension 
funds, sovereign funds and university endowments, generally seek long term investment 
opportunities with a relatively safe risk profile. An interest from these investors to shift away 
from purely financial assets and into infrastructure has been observed through the emergence of 
dedicated social impact funds and examples of institutional investments in ports. This represents 
a growing opportunity for RE to attract an additional pool of investors. 
Applications to different energy technologies – The research presented in this dissertation 
is primarily applied to wind power. Extension of these tools to other energy technologies will 
continue sustainable growth once wind power approaches its resource potential or achieves self-
sustaining growth without the aid of government intervention. Continued use of the strategic 
structure matrix presented in Chapter 3 can determine if certain strategies or strategic profiles of 
government incentives are better suited to increase investment in specific technologies. These 
incentives can also be evaluated for their quantitative impact on investment levels by using the 
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agent-based model presented in Chapter 4, with parameters calibrated to a certain technology in 
a specific location, for example, the use of solar power in India. Additional efforts can 
restructure the agent-based model to help governments and planning agencies decide which 
energy technologies to promote or implement, or how to achieve a particular mix of energy 
sources. The model can also incorporate the embedded carbon footprint inherent in all renewable 
technologies, for example, the carbon byproduct of production and disposal of solar cells. This 
addition can enhance decisions by including the lifecycle environmental impact of renewable 
energy technologies instead of the impact only during the operating life, and achieve more fully 
the sustainability goals behind adoption of clean energy. 
Broader considerations when evaluating energy policy – The findings of this dissertation 
could be complemented by taking a broader view of how wind power and other renewable 
energy technologies interact with one another and the larger energy sector. First, research has 
shown that early and late adopters of an innovation have different characteristics, and hence 
different decision making processes for investment in new technologies (Rogers, 2003). We can 
expect that successful government policies—and on a wider scale, superstructure organization 
actions—and their strategic structures will differ between the earlier and later stages of diffusion. 
Future research can expand the role of the strategic structure matrix presented in Chapter 3 into 
the later stages of diffusion for renewable technologies, especially as the adoption of a certain 
renewable energy approaches its technical potential. Participating in the later stages of a 
technology’s diffusion will also change the actions of investors. The agent-based model 
presented in Chapter 4 assumes that a profitable project will be built without considering the 
actions of other agents and takes resource availability (e.g. wind and land for project 
development) for granted, which is more appropriate for the earlier stages of diffusion. As those 
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resources become scarce, investors can be expected to compete for a limited number of projects. 
Incorporation of agent awareness of the actions or inactions of other agents can enhance the 
model for use when resource availability becomes problematic. Secondly, many new 
technologies are developed and patented by individual firms. The intellectual property issues 
surrounding wide-spread or commercial use of these technologies can increase financial and non-
financial costs to adoption and decrease the speed of diffusion. Incorporation of the national or 
regional attitudes towards intellectual property rights and knowledge sharing into the 
methodologies presented here can improve analysis of how policy can be leveraged to encourage 
renewable energy growth. 
Interactions of policy enhancements – Lastly, in addition to modeling the interactions of 
agents with one another, future efforts can evaluate how the three interventions tested in Chapter 
4 affect one another. The simulation results assumed that changes to one parameter, such as the 
percentage of projects receiving approval as a Clean Development Mechanism project, did not 
impact the other parameters in the model. A more complete analysis can performed by 
determining the correlation and causal relationships between the factors that affect investment 
decision using Monte Carlo simulation and other probabilistic methods when evaluating the 
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